基于防范机会主义的技术创新联盟稳定性研究

Cui Lan, Hu Long-ying
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引用次数: 3

摘要

技术创新联盟成员之间的契约是不完全的,这大大增加了成员采取机会主义行为的可能性,对联盟的稳定性造成了极大的损害。本文运用演化博弈论的方法,将联盟情境划分为弱知识产权保护制度和强知识产权保护制度,构建了基于防范机会主义的技术创新联盟稳定性动态系统方程,并对其稳定性进行了探讨,得出了知识产权保护对技术创新联盟稳定性的重要意义。研究结果可为拟建立或已建立联盟的企业寻求进一步发展提供理论依据和参考价值。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Research on stability of technology innovation alliance based on the safeguard against opportunism
The contract among technology innovation alliance members is incomplete, which substantially increases the probability of members taking opportunistic behavior, resulting in great damages to the stability of the alliance. In this paper, by the method of evolutionary game theory, we divided the context of alliance into weak intellectual property protection system and strong intellectual protection system, structured a dynamic system equation of stability of technology innovation alliance based on the safeguard against opportunism, discussed its stability and concluded the significant importance of intellectual property protection to the stability of technology innovation alliance. These results may provide the theoretical basis and reference value for these enterprises which will prepare to establish or already established the alliance and seek further development.
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