{"title":"全球系统重要性银行分类及其对私人债务结构的影响","authors":"Daeun Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3364959","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Following the classification of large U.S. financial institutions as Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs), I investigate how they respond to stringent requirements imposed both by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), mainly on the aspect of bank lending. I find that, compared to the level prior to the designation, G-SIBs tend to demand tighter loan covenants — specifically, the number of financial covenants, prepayment covenants, and dividend restrictions — to combat the uncertainty about the future state. The increase in the number of covenants is more pronounced among G-SIBs that do not satisfy the capitalization level requirements. Loan size bore by each lead lender is reduced in the period following the classification while maturity does not show significant changes, after controlling for bank/borrower characteristics. The evidence suggests that the new regulation leads banks to institute enhanced measures in an effort to better monitor the borrower’s financials in a more comprehensive fashion, as well as secure repayment if applicable.","PeriodicalId":130859,"journal":{"name":"Baruch College Zicklin School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Global Systemically Important Bank Classification and its Impact on Private Debt Structure\",\"authors\":\"Daeun Lee\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3364959\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Following the classification of large U.S. financial institutions as Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs), I investigate how they respond to stringent requirements imposed both by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), mainly on the aspect of bank lending. I find that, compared to the level prior to the designation, G-SIBs tend to demand tighter loan covenants — specifically, the number of financial covenants, prepayment covenants, and dividend restrictions — to combat the uncertainty about the future state. The increase in the number of covenants is more pronounced among G-SIBs that do not satisfy the capitalization level requirements. Loan size bore by each lead lender is reduced in the period following the classification while maturity does not show significant changes, after controlling for bank/borrower characteristics. The evidence suggests that the new regulation leads banks to institute enhanced measures in an effort to better monitor the borrower’s financials in a more comprehensive fashion, as well as secure repayment if applicable.\",\"PeriodicalId\":130859,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Baruch College Zicklin School of Business Research Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"117 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-12-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Baruch College Zicklin School of Business Research Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3364959\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Baruch College Zicklin School of Business Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3364959","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Global Systemically Important Bank Classification and its Impact on Private Debt Structure
Following the classification of large U.S. financial institutions as Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs), I investigate how they respond to stringent requirements imposed both by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), mainly on the aspect of bank lending. I find that, compared to the level prior to the designation, G-SIBs tend to demand tighter loan covenants — specifically, the number of financial covenants, prepayment covenants, and dividend restrictions — to combat the uncertainty about the future state. The increase in the number of covenants is more pronounced among G-SIBs that do not satisfy the capitalization level requirements. Loan size bore by each lead lender is reduced in the period following the classification while maturity does not show significant changes, after controlling for bank/borrower characteristics. The evidence suggests that the new regulation leads banks to institute enhanced measures in an effort to better monitor the borrower’s financials in a more comprehensive fashion, as well as secure repayment if applicable.