全球系统重要性银行分类及其对私人债务结构的影响

Daeun Lee
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摘要

在将美国大型金融机构分类为全球系统重要性银行(G-SIBs)之后,我研究了它们如何应对巴塞尔银行监管委员会(BCBS)和金融稳定委员会(FSB)施加的严格要求,主要是在银行贷款方面。我发现,与指定之前的水平相比,g - sib倾向于要求更严格的贷款契约-特别是金融契约,预付契约和股息限制的数量-以应对未来状态的不确定性。在不满足资本化水平要求的g - sib中,契约数量的增加更为明显。在控制了银行/借款人的特征后,每个主要贷款人的贷款规模在分类后的期间内减少,而期限没有显示出显着变化。有证据表明,新规定促使银行采取加强措施,以更全面的方式更好地监控借款人的财务状况,并在适用的情况下确保还款。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Global Systemically Important Bank Classification and its Impact on Private Debt Structure
Following the classification of large U.S. financial institutions as Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs), I investigate how they respond to stringent requirements imposed both by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), mainly on the aspect of bank lending. I find that, compared to the level prior to the designation, G-SIBs tend to demand tighter loan covenants — specifically, the number of financial covenants, prepayment covenants, and dividend restrictions — to combat the uncertainty about the future state. The increase in the number of covenants is more pronounced among G-SIBs that do not satisfy the capitalization level requirements. Loan size bore by each lead lender is reduced in the period following the classification while maturity does not show significant changes, after controlling for bank/borrower characteristics. The evidence suggests that the new regulation leads banks to institute enhanced measures in an effort to better monitor the borrower’s financials in a more comprehensive fashion, as well as secure repayment if applicable.
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