{"title":"意图、意志主体与社会理论","authors":"V. Surovtsev","doi":"10.5840/eps20225913","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The article contains some considerations on K.A. Rodin’s reconstruction of the theory of action in works of later L. Wittgenstein. His apophatic approach to descriptions of will, volition, subject of will is analyzed. This approach is compared with approaches to Husserl’s definition of a transcendental subject. It is argued that the apophatic approach to the description of volition as a foundation of social theory is doubtful.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Intention, Subject of Will, and Social Theory\",\"authors\":\"V. Surovtsev\",\"doi\":\"10.5840/eps20225913\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The article contains some considerations on K.A. Rodin’s reconstruction of the theory of action in works of later L. Wittgenstein. His apophatic approach to descriptions of will, volition, subject of will is analyzed. This approach is compared with approaches to Husserl’s definition of a transcendental subject. It is argued that the apophatic approach to the description of volition as a foundation of social theory is doubtful.\",\"PeriodicalId\":369041,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science\",\"volume\":\"82 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps20225913\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps20225913","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The article contains some considerations on K.A. Rodin’s reconstruction of the theory of action in works of later L. Wittgenstein. His apophatic approach to descriptions of will, volition, subject of will is analyzed. This approach is compared with approaches to Husserl’s definition of a transcendental subject. It is argued that the apophatic approach to the description of volition as a foundation of social theory is doubtful.
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