如何指定和证明MANET安全路由协议的正确性

2006 3rd International Conference on Broadband Communications, Networks and Systems Pub Date : 2006-10-01 DOI:10.1109/BROADNETS.2006.4374344

Panos Papadimitratos, Z. Haas, J. Hubaux

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引用次数: 28

摘要

移动自组织网络的安全路由协议最近已经开发出来，然而，由于缺乏对这些协议的正式分析，它们实现的属性一直不清楚。本文主要研究如何指定和证明安全路由协议的正确性。我们提供了一个独立于其功能的协议期望实现的定义，以及通信和对手模型。这样，我们就可以对安全路由协议的正确性进行形式化推理。我们通过分析文献中的两个协议来证明这一点。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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How to Specify and How to Prove Correctness of Secure Routing Protocols for MANET

Secure routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks have been developed recently, yet, it has been unclear what are the properties they achieve, as a formal analysis of these protocols is mostly lacking. In this paper, we are concerned with this problem, how to specify and how to prove the correctness of a secure routing protocol. We provide a definition of what a protocol is expected to achieve independently of its functionality, as well as a communication and adversary models. This way, we enable formal reasoning on the correctness of secure routing protocols. We demonstrate this by analyzing two protocols from the literature.

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2006 3rd International Conference on Broadband Communications, Networks and Systems

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