{"title":"灵魂的错乱","authors":"Allegra de Laurentiis","doi":"10.1017/9781108164184.005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In Moby-Dick; or, the Whale (), Herman Melville writes that “there is no folly of the beasts of the earth which is not infinitely outdone by the madness of man.” Hegel gives a sophisticated explanation of this fact, namely, that proper madness (der Wahn) is a peculiarly human condition. This argument is developed in the context of the Anthropology’s broader theory of the feeling soul (Die fühlende Seele: §§–). This prominently includes an explanation of the endogenous transformation of the sentient organism into bodily self-awareness, a change which Hegel calls the “awakening” of the sentient soul (die empfindende Seele) to the feeling of self (Selbstgefühl: §). The active condition of an individual capable of feeling – no longer capable only of sentience – implies the capacity for self-feeling. This is because the very activity of feeling consists of a permanent leading back of sensations (impressions, affections) toward a center. Since, according to Hegel, the phase of development in which the soul is most prone to being led astray from her path – i.e., to becoming deranged – is precisely the feeling phase, one of the chief features of the feeling soul also marks the common forms of insanity. It is the following: in feeling, there is no distinction for the soul between inner and outer, so that the question of whether the center toward which she refers all her","PeriodicalId":152990,"journal":{"name":"Hegel's <I>Philosophy of Spirit</I>","volume":"14 23","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Derangements of the Soul\",\"authors\":\"Allegra de Laurentiis\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/9781108164184.005\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In Moby-Dick; or, the Whale (), Herman Melville writes that “there is no folly of the beasts of the earth which is not infinitely outdone by the madness of man.” Hegel gives a sophisticated explanation of this fact, namely, that proper madness (der Wahn) is a peculiarly human condition. This argument is developed in the context of the Anthropology’s broader theory of the feeling soul (Die fühlende Seele: §§–). This prominently includes an explanation of the endogenous transformation of the sentient organism into bodily self-awareness, a change which Hegel calls the “awakening” of the sentient soul (die empfindende Seele) to the feeling of self (Selbstgefühl: §). The active condition of an individual capable of feeling – no longer capable only of sentience – implies the capacity for self-feeling. This is because the very activity of feeling consists of a permanent leading back of sensations (impressions, affections) toward a center. Since, according to Hegel, the phase of development in which the soul is most prone to being led astray from her path – i.e., to becoming deranged – is precisely the feeling phase, one of the chief features of the feeling soul also marks the common forms of insanity. It is the following: in feeling, there is no distinction for the soul between inner and outer, so that the question of whether the center toward which she refers all her\",\"PeriodicalId\":152990,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Hegel's <I>Philosophy of Spirit</I>\",\"volume\":\"14 23\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-07-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Hegel's <I>Philosophy of Spirit</I>\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108164184.005\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Hegel's <I>Philosophy of Spirit</I>","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108164184.005","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
摘要
在《白鲸》;或者,鲸鱼(),赫尔曼·梅尔维尔写道:“地球上的野兽没有一种愚蠢不是被人类的疯狂所超越的。”黑格尔对这一事实给出了一个复杂的解释,即,适当的疯狂(der Wahn)是一种特殊的人类状态。这个论点是在人类学关于感觉灵魂的更广泛的理论(Die f hlende Seele:§§-)的背景下发展起来的。这主要包括对有知觉的有机体向身体的自我意识的内在转化的解释,黑格尔把这种转变称为有知觉的灵魂(die empfindende Seele)向自我感觉的“觉醒”(selbstgefhl:§)。一个有感觉能力的人的活动状态——不再仅仅有感觉能力——意味着有自我感觉的能力。这是因为感觉活动本身就是由感觉(印象、情感)向一个中心的持续引导组成的。根据黑格尔的观点,灵魂最容易偏离自己的道路的发展阶段——即变得精神错乱——恰恰是感觉阶段,感觉灵魂的主要特征之一也标志着精神错乱的常见形式。它是这样的:在感觉中,灵魂没有内在和外在的区别,所以她所指的中心是否存在的问题
In Moby-Dick; or, the Whale (), Herman Melville writes that “there is no folly of the beasts of the earth which is not infinitely outdone by the madness of man.” Hegel gives a sophisticated explanation of this fact, namely, that proper madness (der Wahn) is a peculiarly human condition. This argument is developed in the context of the Anthropology’s broader theory of the feeling soul (Die fühlende Seele: §§–). This prominently includes an explanation of the endogenous transformation of the sentient organism into bodily self-awareness, a change which Hegel calls the “awakening” of the sentient soul (die empfindende Seele) to the feeling of self (Selbstgefühl: §). The active condition of an individual capable of feeling – no longer capable only of sentience – implies the capacity for self-feeling. This is because the very activity of feeling consists of a permanent leading back of sensations (impressions, affections) toward a center. Since, according to Hegel, the phase of development in which the soul is most prone to being led astray from her path – i.e., to becoming deranged – is precisely the feeling phase, one of the chief features of the feeling soul also marks the common forms of insanity. It is the following: in feeling, there is no distinction for the soul between inner and outer, so that the question of whether the center toward which she refers all her