{"title":"打破沉默:股东衍生诉讼和修改多德-弗兰克法案,让“薪酬话语权”的投票可以在董事会中听到","authors":"W. Nelson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1988544","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) has broad and deep implications that will touch every corner of the financial services industry, as well as multiple other industries. This article is the first to fully examine shareholder derivative lawsuits filed after a negative “say on pay” vote on executive compensation under the Dodd-Frank Act. The article begins by providing a history of “say on pay” votes and examining the “say on pay” provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. The article transitions into a discussion of how the Dodd-Frank “say on pay” provisions are currently being utilized by shareholders in derivative lawsuits. 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引用次数: 1
摘要
《多德-弗兰克华尔街改革和消费者保护法案》(“多德-弗兰克法案”)具有广泛而深刻的影响,将触及金融服务业的各个角落,以及其他多个行业。本文首次全面研究了在多德-弗兰克法案(Dodd-Frank Act)对高管薪酬“话语权”(say on pay)投票否决后,股东提起的衍生诉讼。本文首先介绍了“薪酬话语权”投票的历史,并考察了《多德-弗兰克法案》(Dodd-Frank Act)的“薪酬话语权”条款。文章过渡到多德-弗兰克“薪酬话语权”条款目前如何被股东在衍生诉讼中利用的讨论。具体而言,本文将详细分析在多德-弗兰克法案颁布后的两项法院判决中,诉讼当事人提出的法律理论和寻求的补救措施。在此分析的基础上,本文为企业如何重新制定“绩效薪酬”高管薪酬政策,以及如何积极主动地应对高管薪酬“薪酬话语权”的负面投票提出了建议。文章最后提出了对《多德-弗兰克法案》(Dodd-Frank Act)的一项修正案,该修正案如果颁布,将规定对高管薪酬进行连续第二次否决的“薪酬话语权”投票(50%或以上的股东投票反对拟议的高管薪酬方案),将促使对“溢薪”决议进行投票,如果该决议通过,除常务董事外的所有董事,必须在通过“泄漏”决议的年度股东大会90天内举行的特别“泄漏”会议上竞选连任。
Ending the Silence: Shareholder Derivative Suits and Amending the Dodd-Frank Act so 'Say on Pay' Votes May Be Heard in the Boardroom
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) has broad and deep implications that will touch every corner of the financial services industry, as well as multiple other industries. This article is the first to fully examine shareholder derivative lawsuits filed after a negative “say on pay” vote on executive compensation under the Dodd-Frank Act. The article begins by providing a history of “say on pay” votes and examining the “say on pay” provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. The article transitions into a discussion of how the Dodd-Frank “say on pay” provisions are currently being utilized by shareholders in derivative lawsuits. Specifically, the article will analyze in detail the legal theories raised and remedies sought by the litigants in the only two post-Dodd-Frank decisions that have been handed down by courts to date. Based on this analysis, the article provides recommendations for companies on how to re-write their “pay for performance” executive compensation policies and how to respond positively and actively to a negative “say on pay” vote on executive compensation. The article concludes by proposing an amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act which, if promulgated, would provide that a second successive negative “say on pay” vote (50% or more of shareholder votes cast against the proposed executive compensation package) on executive compensation would prompt a vote on a “spill” resolution and, if that resolution passes, all directors, except for the managing director, must stand for re-election at a special “spill” meeting within 90 days of the annual shareholder meeting where the “spill” resolution passed.