减少家庭废物政策的现实激励制度是什么?从经济文献和法国案例中吸取的教训

Damien Broussolle
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引用次数: 1

摘要

减少路边垃圾的数量已经成为世界上许多城市的一个重要目标。由于公共垃圾服务的定价往往效率低下,经济学文献提倡一种激励方案,最常见的是单位定价,即“按扔多少付费”制度。基于实证研究、先进经济学著作和法国经验,本文解释了这种方法的局限性。单位定价面临现实困难,不适合集体住房。无论家庭的动机是功利主义的还是价值导向的,对其行为的分析表明,价格的诱导部分的过大延伸可能会带来重大的不便。最后,一个小的激励部分是受欢迎的。这似乎不令人满意,而且与激励定价的基本原则相矛盾,但本文强调事实并非如此。然而,家庭激励计划还必须使用其他诱导机制。其中,押金退还制度最为突出;它的基本目标与单位定价相同,但避免了单位定价的麻烦。注意:论文是用法语写的
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Quel système incitatif réaliste pour la politique de réduction des déchets ménagers ? Enseignements tirés de la littérature économique et du cas français
Reducing the volume of kerbside waste has become a vital goal for many cities in the world. Since the pricing of communal waste services is often inefficient, economic literature promotes an incentive scheme, which most frequently consist in a unit pricing, “pay as you throw” system. Based on empirical studies, advanced economic works and the French experience, the paper explains why this approach is fairly limited. Unit pricing faces practical difficulties and does not fit to collective housing. Whether households’ motivation is utilitarian or value oriented, the analysis of their behaviour shows that, a too large extension of the inducement part of the price, might bring about significant inconveniences. Finally, a small incentive part is to be favoured. It may seem unsatisfactory and contradictory to the very principle of incentive pricing, but the paper underlines it is not so. Nevertheless, an incentive scheme for households must also use other inducing mechanisms. The deposit refund system is the prominent one; it basically aims at the same goals as unit pricing, but avoids its troubles. NOTICE: the paper is in French
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