{"title":"论群体决策方法的哲学ⅰ:多数决定原则的非明显性","authors":"Mathias Risse","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1296638","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Majority rule is often adopted almost by default as a group decision rule. One might think, therefore, that the conditions under which it applies, and the argument on its behalf, are well-understood. However, the standard arguments in support of majority rule display systematic deficiencies. This article explores these weaknesses, and assesses what can be said on behalf of majority rule.","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"On the Philosophy of Group Decision Methods I: The Non-Obviousness of Majority Rule\",\"authors\":\"Mathias Risse\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1296638\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Majority rule is often adopted almost by default as a group decision rule. One might think, therefore, that the conditions under which it applies, and the argument on its behalf, are well-understood. However, the standard arguments in support of majority rule display systematic deficiencies. This article explores these weaknesses, and assesses what can be said on behalf of majority rule.\",\"PeriodicalId\":110014,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"23 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2008-11-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1296638\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1296638","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
On the Philosophy of Group Decision Methods I: The Non-Obviousness of Majority Rule
Majority rule is often adopted almost by default as a group decision rule. One might think, therefore, that the conditions under which it applies, and the argument on its behalf, are well-understood. However, the standard arguments in support of majority rule display systematic deficiencies. This article explores these weaknesses, and assesses what can be said on behalf of majority rule.