D-ORAM:具有不可信内存的云服务器上低执行干扰的路径- oram委托

Rujia Wang, Youtao Zhang, Jun Yang
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引用次数: 22

摘要

云计算已经发展成为一种很有前途的计算范式。然而,保护云服务器上的应用程序隐私,特别是内存访问模式,仍然是一项具有挑战性的任务。Path ORAM协议实现了高级的隐私保护,但需要较大的内存带宽,这将引入严重的执行干扰。最近提出的安全内存模型大大降低了安全增强的开销,但需要加密逻辑和存储设备的安全集成,这种存储架构在主流云服务器中尚未普及。,,,,在本文中,我们提出了一种新的路径ORAM方案D-ORAM,用于在具有不可信内存的云服务器上实现高级别隐私保护和低执行干扰。D-ORAM利用板上缓冲(BOB)内存架构将Path ORAM原语卸载到BOB单元中的安全引擎,这大大减轻了安全和非安全应用程序之间对片外内存总线的争夺。D-ORAM仅对一个安全内存通道进行升级,并采用Path ORAM树拆分的方式,将安全应用灵活地扩展到多个通道,特别是非安全通道。D-ORAM通过优化链路利用率,进一步提高系统性能。我们的评估表明,D-ORAM有效地保护了具有不可信内存的主流计算服务器上的应用程序隐私,与Path ORAM基线相比,NS-App性能平均提高了22.5%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
D-ORAM: Path-ORAM Delegation for Low Execution Interference on Cloud Servers with Untrusted Memory
Cloud computing has evolved into a promising computing paradigm. However, it remains a challenging task to protect application privacy and, in particular, the memory access patterns, on cloud servers. The Path ORAM protocol achieves high-level privacy protection but requires large memory bandwidth, which introduces severe execution interference. The recently proposed secure memory model greatly reduces the security enhancement overhead but demands the secure integration of cryptographic logic and memory devices, a memory architecture that is yet to prevail in mainstream cloud servers.,,,, In this paper, we propose D-ORAM, a novel Path ORAM scheme for achieving high-level privacy protection and low execution interference on cloud servers with untrusted memory. D-ORAM leverages the buffer-on-board (BOB) memory architecture to offload the Path ORAM primitives to a secure engine in the BOB unit, which greatly alleviates the contention for the off-chip memory bus between secure and non-secure applications. D-ORAM upgrades only one secure memory channel and employs Path ORAM tree split to extend the secure application flexibly across multiple channels, in particular, the non-secure channels. D-ORAM optimizes the link utilization to further improve the system performance. Our evaluation shows that D-ORAM effectively protects application privacy on mainstream computing servers with untrusted memory, with an improvement of NS-App performance by 22.5% on average over the Path ORAM baseline.
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