网络监控和承包系统:竞争和创新

Paul Laskowski, J. Chuang
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引用次数: 56

摘要

今天的互联网行业有几个众所周知的弊病,但从长远来看,没有一个比它对进化的抵制更具有破坏性。互联网服务提供商目前正在走向更大的商品化,而不是引入新的服务。很明显,网络的原始合约系统并没有恰当地调整激励机制。在本研究中,我们认为网络缺乏问责制是纠正这一问题的根本障碍:我们采用经济模型,认为除非引入新的监控能力并将其纳入合同系统,否则不可能实现最佳路线和创新。此外,我们推导出监控系统必须满足的最低要求,以支持最佳路由和创新特性。我们的工作并不构成一项新的议定书;相反,我们为监测系统的设计提供了实践和具体的指导,并为探索影响创新的因素提供了理论框架。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Network monitors and contracting systems: competition and innovation
Today's Internet industry suffers from several well-known pathologies, but none is as destructive in the long term as its resistance to evolution. Rather than introducing new services, ISPs are presently moving towards greater commoditization. It is apparent that the network's primitive system of contracts does not align incentives properly. In this study, we identify the network's lack of accountability as a fundamental obstacle to correcting this problem: Employing an economic model, we argue that optimal routes and innovation are impossible unless new monitoring capability is introduced and incorporated with the contracting system. Furthermore, we derive the minimum requirements a monitoring system must meet to support first-best routing and innovation characteristics. Our work does not constitute a new protocol; rather, we provide practical and specific guidance for the design of monitoring systems, as well as a theoretical framework to explore the factors that influence innovation.
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