《权利法案》与各州:一个视角的总览

M. Curtis
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Critics at the time typically dismissed Justice Black's analysis. Curiously, they often totally ignored Professor Crosskey's long law review article responding to Professor Fairman's article on the same subject. As a law student and practicing lawyer, I made a few ineffective attempts to get scholars to at least read and discuss the Crosskey rebuttal. Finally, thanks to a law partner who loaned me Raoul Berger's Government by Judiciary, I began to write about the subject myself. In this article, I discuss the substantial historical case for applying the liberties to the states under the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I do so using multiple modes of analysis. The best way to understand historic meaning is multi-factorial, as opposed to the \"one true method\" of understanding. 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The suppression had taken place in the South for more than thirty years before the Civil War, and as the war approached Republicans had their speech, press, and assembly suppressed. The historical context also includes, of course, the racial discrimination of the Black Codes immediately after the war. A number of those codes not only discriminated, but also struck at basic constitutional liberties-if one assumes, as leading Republicans did, that the states were obliged to obey them. The codes abridged the right of blacks to preach, to worship together with a minister of their choice, to assemble, to speak, to bear arms, and to be free from cruel punishments. The great failing of the work of scholars such as Professor Fairman and Raoul Berger was to consider far too limited a context. 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引用次数: 1

摘要

《权利法案与各州:一个视角的概述》讨论了《权利法案》适用于各州的历史证据,主要是根据《第十四修正案》的特权或豁免条款。本文还简要讨论了正当程序下的申请。这篇文章讲述了我对将《权利法案》应用于各州的兴趣(从20世纪60年代的大学开始),以及20世纪70年代和80年代法律学者普遍认为历史并不支持将自由适用于各州的共识。他们中的许多人依赖于查尔斯·费尔曼教授的工作,他至少拒绝了全部的应用,这些学者认为费尔曼的工作是“结论性的”。事实上,一些人认为这不利于普遍应用。后来,许多人依靠拉乌尔·伯杰。当时的批评者通常对布莱克法官的分析不屑一顾。奇怪的是,他们经常完全忽视克罗斯基教授对费尔曼教授关于同一主题的文章的长篇法律评论文章。作为一名法律系学生和执业律师,我做了几次无效的尝试,试图让学者们至少阅读和讨论克罗斯基的反驳。最后,多亏一位律师合伙人借给我拉乌尔·伯杰(Raoul Berger)的《司法政府》(Government by Judiciary),我才开始自己写这方面的文章。在这篇文章中,我将讨论根据第十四修正案的特权或豁免条款将自由适用于各州的实质性历史案例。我使用了多种分析模式。理解历史意义的最好方法是多因素的,而不是“一种真正的方法”。我建议的方法(感谢其他人的贡献)是历史背景,根据历史上如何使用“特权”和“豁免”这两个词来描述《权利法案》自由的修正案文本,背景(或文本间分析),先例,主要制宪者的观点,1866年运动中的讨论,这主要是对第十四修正案的全民公决,批准的限制,以及宪法结构。我在这篇摘要中总结了其中的一些。历史背景:因为意义是与上下文相关的,所以从历史背景开始是一个很好的起点。这一背景包括在南方(有时在北方)为了奴隶制的利益而压制言论、出版、集会、结社、宗教自由和其他基本的《权利法案》自由。在南北战争之前,这种镇压已经在南方进行了三十多年,随着战争的临近,共和党人的言论、出版和集会都受到了压制。当然,历史背景也包括战后黑人法典的种族歧视。其中一些法规不仅歧视,而且侵犯了基本的宪法自由——如果有人像共和党领袖那样认为,各州有义务遵守这些法规的话。这些法典剥夺了黑人传教的权利,剥夺了他们与自己选择的牧师一起做礼拜的权利,剥夺了他们集会、演讲、携带武器的权利,剥夺了他们免受残酷惩罚的权利。费尔曼教授和拉乌尔•伯杰等学者的研究中最大的失误在于,他们考虑的背景太过局限。克罗斯基教授的伟大贡献之一是,他建议通过观察共和党人对南方(战前和战后)剥夺公民自由的抱怨,以及他们的法律思想,来扩大这一背景。克罗斯基认识到,许多共和党制宪者的法律观念与最高法院的判决不一致。他们认为德雷德·斯科特案和巴伦诉巴尔的摩案等判决是错误的,需要纠正。本文还讨论了其他的分析模式。注:这篇文章源于我应邀参加圣地亚哥大学法学院关于《人权法案》合并的会议。这次会议由美国宪法原旨主义研究所共同主办。这篇论文和会议上的其他论文将发表在《当代法律问题杂志》上。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Bill of Rights and the States: An Overview from One Perspective
"The Bill of Rights and the States: An Overview From One Perspective," discusses historical evidence for application of the Bill of Rights to the states, primarily under the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It also briefly discusses application under due process. The article tells about my interest in application of the Bill of Rights to the States (starting with college in the 1960s) and about the wide spread agreement among legal academics in the 1970s and 1980s that history did not support applying the liberties to the states. Many of these relied on the work of Professor Charles Fairman, which rejected, at least, total application, and these scholars assumed Fairman's work was "conclusive." Indeed, some thought it disproved application generally. Later many relied on Raoul Berger. Critics at the time typically dismissed Justice Black's analysis. Curiously, they often totally ignored Professor Crosskey's long law review article responding to Professor Fairman's article on the same subject. As a law student and practicing lawyer, I made a few ineffective attempts to get scholars to at least read and discuss the Crosskey rebuttal. Finally, thanks to a law partner who loaned me Raoul Berger's Government by Judiciary, I began to write about the subject myself. In this article, I discuss the substantial historical case for applying the liberties to the states under the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I do so using multiple modes of analysis. The best way to understand historic meaning is multi-factorial, as opposed to the "one true method" of understanding. The methods I suggest (thanks to the contributions of others ) are historical context, the text of the amendment viewed in light of how the words "privileges" and "immunities' were used historically to describe Bill of Rights liberties, context (or inter-textual analysis), precedent, the views of leading framers, discussion in the campaign of 1866 which was largely a referendum on the Fourteenth Amendment, limited light from ratification, and constitutional structure. I summarize a few of these in this abstract. Historical context: Since meaning is contextual, a good place to start is with the historical context. That context includes the suppression of speech, press, assembly, association, free exercise of religion, and other basic Bill of Rights liberties in the South (and sometimes in the North) in the interest of slavery. The suppression had taken place in the South for more than thirty years before the Civil War, and as the war approached Republicans had their speech, press, and assembly suppressed. The historical context also includes, of course, the racial discrimination of the Black Codes immediately after the war. A number of those codes not only discriminated, but also struck at basic constitutional liberties-if one assumes, as leading Republicans did, that the states were obliged to obey them. The codes abridged the right of blacks to preach, to worship together with a minister of their choice, to assemble, to speak, to bear arms, and to be free from cruel punishments. The great failing of the work of scholars such as Professor Fairman and Raoul Berger was to consider far too limited a context. One of the great contributions of Professor Crosskey was to suggest expanding the context by looking at Republican complaints about denials of civil liberty in the South (before and after the war) and looking at their legal ideas. Crosskey recognized that many Republican framers held legal ideas that did not accord with Supreme Court decisions. They saw decisions such as Dred Scott and Barron v. Baltimore as wrong and in need of correction. Other modes of analysis are discussed in the paper. Note: This article grew out of an invitation to participate in a conference on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights at the University of San Diego School of Law. The conference was co-sponsored by the USD Institute for the Study of Constitutional Originalism. This and other papers from the conference will be published in The Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues.
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