非法市场执法的意外后果

Criminology eJournal Pub Date : 2014-07-17 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2467898

J. Prieger, Jonathan Kulick

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引用次数: 13

摘要

对商品实施禁令可以减少黑市的规模，但却增加了非法市场的收入，从而导致更大的暴力。然而，即使在竞争市场中，执法和暴力之间的联系也不像教科书模型所建议的那样简单。然而，在看似合理的假设下，对非法商品贩运的更多执法会导致更多暴力。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Unintended Consequences of Enforcement in Illicit Markets

Legal enforcement of bans on goods can reduce the size of the black market but lead to greater violence by increasing revenue in the illicit market. However, the link between enforcement and violence is not as simple as is suggested by the textbook model, even for a competitive market. Nevertheless, under plausible assumptions more enforcement on trafficking in the illicit good leads to more violence.

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Criminology eJournal

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