{"title":"我为什么要这么做?","authors":"F. Huber","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780199976119.003.0005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter first answers the question of why conditional beliefs should obey the axioms and update rule of ranking theory. This includes a defense of the conditional theory of conditional belief that characterizes conditional belief in terms of belief and counterfactuals. Then the instrumentalist view of rationality, or normativity, underlying this answer is discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of conditional obligation and conditional belief.","PeriodicalId":407642,"journal":{"name":"Belief and Counterfactuals","volume":"25 7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Why Should I?\",\"authors\":\"F. Huber\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780199976119.003.0005\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter first answers the question of why conditional beliefs should obey the axioms and update rule of ranking theory. This includes a defense of the conditional theory of conditional belief that characterizes conditional belief in terms of belief and counterfactuals. Then the instrumentalist view of rationality, or normativity, underlying this answer is discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of conditional obligation and conditional belief.\",\"PeriodicalId\":407642,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Belief and Counterfactuals\",\"volume\":\"25 7 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-11-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Belief and Counterfactuals\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199976119.003.0005\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Belief and Counterfactuals","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199976119.003.0005","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter first answers the question of why conditional beliefs should obey the axioms and update rule of ranking theory. This includes a defense of the conditional theory of conditional belief that characterizes conditional belief in terms of belief and counterfactuals. Then the instrumentalist view of rationality, or normativity, underlying this answer is discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of conditional obligation and conditional belief.