{"title":"仲裁与争议海域的海洋资源","authors":"T. Morgandi","doi":"10.1093/law/9780198796190.003.0020","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter studies the role of arbitration for offshore resources in\n disputed maritime areas. It is an observable fact that disputes over\n maritime boundaries are mostly caused by competing desires of states to\n exploit offshore natural resources, in particular oil and gas deposits.\n Indeed, it is well known that the law on maritime boundaries was\n developed precisely in order to allocate rights over offshore natural\n resources. However, it has also long been observed that the law on\n maritime boundary delimitation, as developed by international tribunals,\n ostensibly pays only scant regard to this underlying basis of the\n disputes at issue. Rather, the law purports to base itself on other\n principles. In particular, the unilateral activities of the parties are\n consistently rejected as being ‘relevant circumstances’ relevant to a\n boundary delimitation. However, if one looks at what tribunals do,\n instead of what they say they do, it seems that in fact the unilateral\n activities of the parties concerning the exploitation of offshore\n hydrocarbons play a rather larger role. Whenever tribunals have some\n discretion, they invariably choose a delimitation line that gives oil\n and gas deposits to those parties that have taken the initiative to\n drill them unilaterally, provided that this drilling has taken place at\n least within a plausible boundary of the state that issued the\n concession. Moreover, tribunals are extremely reluctant to draw\n boundaries over drilled deposits, thus avoiding making them shared as a\n result of the delimitation exercise.","PeriodicalId":448349,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of International Arbitration","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Arbitration and Offshore Resources in Disputed Maritime Areas\",\"authors\":\"T. Morgandi\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/law/9780198796190.003.0020\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter studies the role of arbitration for offshore resources in\\n disputed maritime areas. It is an observable fact that disputes over\\n maritime boundaries are mostly caused by competing desires of states to\\n exploit offshore natural resources, in particular oil and gas deposits.\\n Indeed, it is well known that the law on maritime boundaries was\\n developed precisely in order to allocate rights over offshore natural\\n resources. However, it has also long been observed that the law on\\n maritime boundary delimitation, as developed by international tribunals,\\n ostensibly pays only scant regard to this underlying basis of the\\n disputes at issue. Rather, the law purports to base itself on other\\n principles. In particular, the unilateral activities of the parties are\\n consistently rejected as being ‘relevant circumstances’ relevant to a\\n boundary delimitation. However, if one looks at what tribunals do,\\n instead of what they say they do, it seems that in fact the unilateral\\n activities of the parties concerning the exploitation of offshore\\n hydrocarbons play a rather larger role. Whenever tribunals have some\\n discretion, they invariably choose a delimitation line that gives oil\\n and gas deposits to those parties that have taken the initiative to\\n drill them unilaterally, provided that this drilling has taken place at\\n least within a plausible boundary of the state that issued the\\n concession. Moreover, tribunals are extremely reluctant to draw\\n boundaries over drilled deposits, thus avoiding making them shared as a\\n result of the delimitation exercise.\",\"PeriodicalId\":448349,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Oxford Handbook of International Arbitration\",\"volume\":\"5 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-09-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Oxford Handbook of International Arbitration\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198796190.003.0020\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Oxford Handbook of International Arbitration","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198796190.003.0020","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Arbitration and Offshore Resources in Disputed Maritime Areas
This chapter studies the role of arbitration for offshore resources in
disputed maritime areas. It is an observable fact that disputes over
maritime boundaries are mostly caused by competing desires of states to
exploit offshore natural resources, in particular oil and gas deposits.
Indeed, it is well known that the law on maritime boundaries was
developed precisely in order to allocate rights over offshore natural
resources. However, it has also long been observed that the law on
maritime boundary delimitation, as developed by international tribunals,
ostensibly pays only scant regard to this underlying basis of the
disputes at issue. Rather, the law purports to base itself on other
principles. In particular, the unilateral activities of the parties are
consistently rejected as being ‘relevant circumstances’ relevant to a
boundary delimitation. However, if one looks at what tribunals do,
instead of what they say they do, it seems that in fact the unilateral
activities of the parties concerning the exploitation of offshore
hydrocarbons play a rather larger role. Whenever tribunals have some
discretion, they invariably choose a delimitation line that gives oil
and gas deposits to those parties that have taken the initiative to
drill them unilaterally, provided that this drilling has taken place at
least within a plausible boundary of the state that issued the
concession. Moreover, tribunals are extremely reluctant to draw
boundaries over drilled deposits, thus avoiding making them shared as a
result of the delimitation exercise.