{"title":"合作与非合作决策问题中的冲动性与信息","authors":"V. Ventre, A. Longo","doi":"10.14505//JMEF.V4.1(6).01","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Psychological evidences of impulsivity and false consensus eect lead results far from rationality. It is shown that impulsivity modies the discount function of each individual, and false consensus eect increases the degree of consensus in a multi-agent decision problem. Analyzing them together we note that in strategic interactions these two human factors involve choices which change equilibriums expected by rational individuals.","PeriodicalId":367341,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics and Finance","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Impulsivity and information in cooperative and non-cooperative decision problems\",\"authors\":\"V. Ventre, A. Longo\",\"doi\":\"10.14505//JMEF.V4.1(6).01\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Psychological evidences of impulsivity and false consensus eect lead results far from rationality. It is shown that impulsivity modies the discount function of each individual, and false consensus eect increases the degree of consensus in a multi-agent decision problem. Analyzing them together we note that in strategic interactions these two human factors involve choices which change equilibriums expected by rational individuals.\",\"PeriodicalId\":367341,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Mathematical Economics and Finance\",\"volume\":\"5 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-06-30\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Mathematical Economics and Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.14505//JMEF.V4.1(6).01\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Mathematical Economics and Finance","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.14505//JMEF.V4.1(6).01","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Impulsivity and information in cooperative and non-cooperative decision problems
Psychological evidences of impulsivity and false consensus eect lead results far from rationality. It is shown that impulsivity modies the discount function of each individual, and false consensus eect increases the degree of consensus in a multi-agent decision problem. Analyzing them together we note that in strategic interactions these two human factors involve choices which change equilibriums expected by rational individuals.
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