特定企业流动模型中存在集聚力的分散污染标准制定

Mitch Kunce
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在此基础上,我们对传统的环境间管辖权竞争模型进行了扩充,并在集聚经济条件下引入了特定的企业流动性。现在,一个辖区内的公司数量在分散效率的故事中变得相关。具体来说,当集聚力足够强大时,企业的运动就会受到抑制。旨在影响企业选址决策的环境政策相对无效。因此,各司法管辖区都有过度保护环境质量的动机——这是一场力争上游的竞赛。还研究了企业税收对权力下放效率的影响。JEL分类号:Q51、Q58、R38。关键词:分散环境规制,集聚经济,企业区位。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Decentralized Pollution Standard Setting with Agglomeration Forces Present in a Model of Specific Firm Mobility
Abstract Herein we augment the traditional devolved environmental interjurisdictional-competition model with specific firm mobility in the presence of agglomeration economies. Now the number of firms in a jurisdiction becomes pertinent in the story of decentralized efficiency. Specifically, when agglomeration forces are sufficiently strong, firm movement is subdued. Placed-based environmental policies aimed at swaying a firm's location decision are rendered relatively ineffective. As a result, jurisdictions possess incentives to excessively overprotect environmental quality − a race-to-the-top. Firm taxation effects on devolved efficiency are also examined. JEL classification numbers: Q51, Q58, R38. Keywords: Decentralized environmental regulation, Agglomeration economies, Firm location.
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