{"title":"扩大情报问责制","authors":"Damien Van Puyvelde","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474450225.003.0002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter develops a conceptual model of intelligence accountability as a relationship between accountability holders and holdees, or principals and agents. This model identifies three conditions for accountability to occur: access to information, existence of adequate standards, and authority and willingness to use them. The model posits that the existence of these conditions and the broader relationship between accountability holders and holdees are not fixed in time. When one or more of these conditions is not satisfied, accountability problems emerge and trigger responses that may or may not fill accountability gaps. This conceptual model is used to broaden the study of intelligence accountability – which has largely focused on the role of the three branches of government – and take into account the place of non-state actors in the U.S. system of intelligence accountability.","PeriodicalId":177104,"journal":{"name":"Outsourcing US Intelligence","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Broadening Intelligence Accountability\",\"authors\":\"Damien Van Puyvelde\",\"doi\":\"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474450225.003.0002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter develops a conceptual model of intelligence accountability as a relationship between accountability holders and holdees, or principals and agents. This model identifies three conditions for accountability to occur: access to information, existence of adequate standards, and authority and willingness to use them. The model posits that the existence of these conditions and the broader relationship between accountability holders and holdees are not fixed in time. When one or more of these conditions is not satisfied, accountability problems emerge and trigger responses that may or may not fill accountability gaps. This conceptual model is used to broaden the study of intelligence accountability – which has largely focused on the role of the three branches of government – and take into account the place of non-state actors in the U.S. system of intelligence accountability.\",\"PeriodicalId\":177104,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Outsourcing US Intelligence\",\"volume\":\"68 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Outsourcing US Intelligence\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474450225.003.0002\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Outsourcing US Intelligence","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474450225.003.0002","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter develops a conceptual model of intelligence accountability as a relationship between accountability holders and holdees, or principals and agents. This model identifies three conditions for accountability to occur: access to information, existence of adequate standards, and authority and willingness to use them. The model posits that the existence of these conditions and the broader relationship between accountability holders and holdees are not fixed in time. When one or more of these conditions is not satisfied, accountability problems emerge and trigger responses that may or may not fill accountability gaps. This conceptual model is used to broaden the study of intelligence accountability – which has largely focused on the role of the three branches of government – and take into account the place of non-state actors in the U.S. system of intelligence accountability.