Judicial Discretion in Light of the New European Rules on Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters: Reform or Continuity?

The free movement of judgments can be presented as a necessary corollary of the European internal market where goods, people, services and capital move freely. The first step towards the adoption of harmonized private international law provisions was made in 1968 with the conclusion of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. In 1999, the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam transferred the competence to legislate in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters from the Member States to the European Union. This led to the transformation of the 1968 Brussels Convention, an instrument of inter-governmental cooperation, into a Regulation: Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, colloquially known as ‘Brussels I’. Subsequently, a Recast (reform) of the Regulation was agreed in 2012 which substantially amended Brussels I, and will replace it from 10 January 2015. This paper evaluates the extent to which the new jurisdiction rules of the Brussels I Recast impact on the exercise of judicial discretion by courts in the EU. This question is closely linked with the nature of Brussels I as a civilian instrument. Part I will consider how the activism of the European Court of Justice (now Court of Justice of the EU) had reinforced the civilian imprint of the Brussels I Regulation. Part II will assess whether the Recast is breaking away from what has been, for a period, considered the ‘systematic dismantling of the common law of conflict of laws’ by the EC (now EU). The article concludes that under the Brussels I Recast, the domain of both anti-suit injunctions and forum non conveniens has, if anything, been even further reduced. However the Recast has not only corrected some of the unwelcome consequences of an overly civilian interpretation of the Brussels I Regulation but simultaneously introduced, on the whole territory of the EU, a harmonised mechanism of jurisdictional regulation based on judicial discretion (which was hitherto available only in a few Member States). On this aspect, the Recast has the great merit of promoting (at least on paper) a better coordination between European and third States procedures, and one that may be easier to anticipate in third countries.