顾客-供应商关系的经济学和金融学

Ling Cen, S. Dasgupta
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引用次数: 1

摘要

上游供应商公司和下游客户公司之间的相互关系——通常被称为供应链关系——构成了经济中最重要的联系之一。供应商不仅为客户提供生产投入,而且越来越多地参与对客户有利的研发和创新活动。然而,此类活动所涉及的高度关系专一性,以及撰写完整合同的难度,使供应商面临潜在的拖延问题。缓解机会主义的机制对这种关系的起源、企业边界和组织结构都有影响。较小的供应商公司在许多方面受益于与大客户公司的关系,例如知识共享、运营效率、免于竞争以及在资本市场上的声誉。然而,客户议价能力、单一的客户基础和创新战略也使供应商面临中断风险。投资的关系特异性、客户议价能力和客户集中度与较少多样化的客户基础相关,对供应商和客户的融资决策有重要影响,如资本结构选择和贸易信贷的提供和作用。中断风险的变化(例如,破产申请、收购活动和信贷市场冲击)会对整个供应链产生溢出效应。供应商和客户的经济基本面的相关性以及他们从市场参与者那里得到的共同关注转化为回报的可预测性(对交易策略的影响)、供应链上的信息扩散以及供应链合作伙伴的股价信息。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Economics and Finance of Customer-Supplier Relationships
The interrelationships between upstream supplier firms and downstream customer firms—popularly referred to as supply-chain relationships—constitute one of the most important linkages in the economy. Suppliers not only provide production inputs for their customers but, increasingly, also engage in R&D and innovation activity that is beneficial to the customers. Yet, the high degree of relationship specificity that such activities involve, and the difficulty of writing complete contracts, expose suppliers to potential hold-up problems. Mechanisms that mitigate opportunism have implications for the origins of such relationships, firm boundary, and organizational structure. Smaller supplier firms benefit from relationships with large customer firms in many ways, such as knowledge sharing, operational efficiency, insulation from competition, and reputation in capital markets. However, customer bargaining power, undiversified customer base, and innovation strategy also expose suppliers to disruption risk. Relationship specificity of investment, customer bargaining power, and customer concentration associated with a less diversified customer base have important consequences for financing decisions of suppliers and customers, such as capital structure choice and the provision and role of trade credit. Changes in the risk of disruption (e.g., bankruptcy filings, takeover activity, and credit market shocks) have spillover effects along the supply chain. The correlation of economic fundamentals of suppliers and customers and the co-attention that they receive from market participants translate to return predictability (with implications for trading strategies), information diffusion along the supply chain, and stock-price informativeness of supply-chain partners.
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