摩尔与标准问题

Joshua Anderson
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本文中,我将对摩尔在《常识的辩护》和《外部世界的证明》中提出的认识论进行理解。为了构建讨论框架,我参考了罗德里克·奇泽姆(Roderick Chisholm)的文章《标准的问题》。我首先看一下奇泽姆认为人们可以对标准问题作出反应的两种方式,然后,回顾摩尔的文章,解释为什么奇泽姆相信他正在遵循摩尔可能采取的推理路线并非不合理。然后,我说明了为什么我认为奇泽姆实际上试图做一些与摩尔完全不同的事情,从而错过了摩尔的真正观点。我的结论是,最好理解摩尔是拒绝传统认识论的关注。通过迫使摩尔处理一个传统的认识论问题,我们将清楚地看到摩尔的“认识论”是多么大胆。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
G.E. Moore and the Problem of the Criterion
In this paper, I offer an understanding of G.E. Moore’s epistemology as presented in, “A Defence of Common Sense” and “Proof of an External World.” To frame the discussion, I look to Roderick Chisholm’s essay, The Problem of the Criterion. I begin by looking at two ways that Chisholm believes one can respond to the problem of the criterion, and, referring back to Moore’s essays, explain why it is not unreasonable for Chisholm to believe that he is following a line of reasoning that Moore might take. I then show why I believe Chisholm is actually trying to do something quite different from what Moore was, and thus misses Moore’s actual point. I conclude that Moore is best understood as rejecting traditional epistemological concerns. By forcing Moore to deal with a traditional epistemological problem, it will become clear how bold Moore’s “epistemology” is.
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