多德-弗兰克法案下监管公平披露的修订与信用评级发行的时机

Ashiq Ali, Hoyoun Kyung, Ningzhong Li
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引用次数: 8

摘要

2010年的多德-弗兰克法案取消了允许美国上市公司向信用评级机构选择性披露信息的监管公平披露规则。然而,评级机构和法律专家认为,考虑到《公平披露条例》中的其他条款,即允许公司在明确同意保密的情况下向评级机构进行选择性披露,这一修订不太可能影响它们获取发行人的非公开信息。本研究探讨信用评级机构对信用评级发布时机的影响,以解决监管变化后评级机构对非公开信息的获取是否减少的问题。我们发现,在监管变化后,评级机构在公司发布收益公告后下调评级的可能性增加。这一结果表明,在监管发生变化后,发行人减少了对评级机构的负面信息选择性披露,从而增加了评级机构对公司公开披露的依赖。我们进一步表明,上述结果对于更有动机向评级机构隐瞒坏消息的公司更为明显。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Revision of Regulation Fair Disclosure under the Dodd-Frank Act and the Timing of Credit Rating Issuances
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 eliminated a Regulation Fair Disclosure rule, which allowed U.S. public companies to make selective disclosures to credit rating agencies (CRAs). However, CRAs and legal experts argue that given the other provisions in Regulation Fair Disclosure, which allow companies to make selective disclosures to CRAs if they expressly agree to keep the confidentiality, this revision is unlikely to affect their access to issuers’ non-public information. This study investigates the effect on the timing of credit rating issuances to address whether CRAs’ access to non-public information reduces after the regulatory change. We show that after the regulatory change, the likelihood of CRAs issuing rating downgrades following firms’ earnings announcements increases. This result suggests that after the regulatory change, issuer firms reduce selective disclosure of negative information to CRAs, thereby increasing CRAs’ reliance on firms’ public disclosures. We further show that the above result is more pronounced for firms with greater incentive to withhold bad news from CRAs.
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