在树莓派上实现的RSA算法的EM辐射侧信道分析

Ersin Hatun, Gokhan Kaya, Elif Buyukkaya, S. Yalcin
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引用次数: 2

摘要

密码系统在加密过程中无意中泄露的侧信道信息(功耗、电磁辐射等)可以被攻击者利用侧信道分析来泄露机密数据。一些最常见的侧信道分析是SPA(简单功率分析),DPA(差分功率分析),SEMA(简单电磁分析)和DEMA(差分电磁分析)。虽然分析从ASIC或FPGA实现中获得的侧信道信息相对容易,但分析在操作系统(OS)中运行的加密操作的侧信道信息有不同的困难-例如,测量的对齐和从其他操作系统操作的噪声中提取加密过程信号。在本研究中,通过使用与树莓派平台上实现的加密操作功耗相关的电磁辐射,对RSA算法的两种不同实现进行了侧信道攻击。首先采用无保护的二进制算法实现RSA算法,然后利用SEMA攻击逐个获取RSA算法的私钥位。对于第二种实现,RSA算法通过使用受保护的二进制算法来实现,以抵御SEMA攻击。在本文中,使用1800次测量,使用均值距离检验和相关分析,找到了私钥的第一个比特。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Side Channel Analysis Using EM Radiation of RSA Algorithm Implemented on Raspberry Pi
The side-channel information (power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, etc.) leaked unintentionally from a cryptographic system during a cryptographic process can be used by attackers to reveal secret data using side-channel analysis. Some of the most common side-channel analysis are SPA (Simple Power Analysis), DPA (Differential Power Analysis), SEMA (Simple Electromagnetic Analysis) and DEMA (Differential Electromagnetic Analysis). Although it is relatively easy to analyze the side-channel information obtained from the ASIC or FPGA implementations, the analysis of a side channel information of cryptographic operations running in an operating system (OS) has different difficulties - for example, alignment of measurements and extracting crypto process signal through noises of other OS operations. In this study, side-channel attacks are performed against two different realizations of the RSA Algorithm by using electromagnetic radiation related with power consumption of a cryptographic operation implemented on Raspberry Pi platform. The first realization of the RSA Algorithm is implemented using unprotected binary algorithm and then private key bits of the RSA Algorithm are get individually by using SEMA attack. For the second realization, the RSA Algorithm is implemented by using a protected binary algorithm in order to resist against to SEMA attack. In presented work, the first bit of the private key has been found using 1800 measurements with the distance of mean test and correlation analysis.
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