{"title":"验证有限数量的会话及其复杂性","authors":"M. Rusinowitch, Mathieu Turuani","doi":"10.3233/978-1-60750-714-7-13","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the complexity of the protocol insecurity pr oblem for a finite number of sessions (fixed number of interleaved runs). We show that this problem is NP-complete with respect to a Dolev-Yao model of i ntruders. The result does not assume a limit on the size of messages and supports as ymetric and nonatomic symmetric encryption keys. We also prove that in orde r to build an attack with a fixed number of sessions the intruder needs only to forg e messages of linear size, provided that they are represented as DAGs.","PeriodicalId":253475,"journal":{"name":"Formal Models and Techniques for Analyzing Security Protocols","volume":"89 22","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Verifying a bounded number of sessions and its complexity\",\"authors\":\"M. Rusinowitch, Mathieu Turuani\",\"doi\":\"10.3233/978-1-60750-714-7-13\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We investigate the complexity of the protocol insecurity pr oblem for a finite number of sessions (fixed number of interleaved runs). We show that this problem is NP-complete with respect to a Dolev-Yao model of i ntruders. The result does not assume a limit on the size of messages and supports as ymetric and nonatomic symmetric encryption keys. We also prove that in orde r to build an attack with a fixed number of sessions the intruder needs only to forg e messages of linear size, provided that they are represented as DAGs.\",\"PeriodicalId\":253475,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Formal Models and Techniques for Analyzing Security Protocols\",\"volume\":\"89 22\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Formal Models and Techniques for Analyzing Security Protocols\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-60750-714-7-13\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Formal Models and Techniques for Analyzing Security Protocols","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-60750-714-7-13","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Verifying a bounded number of sessions and its complexity
We investigate the complexity of the protocol insecurity pr oblem for a finite number of sessions (fixed number of interleaved runs). We show that this problem is NP-complete with respect to a Dolev-Yao model of i ntruders. The result does not assume a limit on the size of messages and supports as ymetric and nonatomic symmetric encryption keys. We also prove that in orde r to build an attack with a fixed number of sessions the intruder needs only to forg e messages of linear size, provided that they are represented as DAGs.
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