T. Katashita, A. Sasaki, Y. Hori, M. Shiozaki, T. Fujino
{"title":"嵌入式设备物理攻击评估环境的开发","authors":"T. Katashita, A. Sasaki, Y. Hori, M. Shiozaki, T. Fujino","doi":"10.1109/GCCE.2012.6379924","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Physical attacks against cryptographic modules on embedded systems are different with theoretical analysis. Side-channel attacks, which are noninvasive physical attacks, exploit the measurable parameters of devices. In this study, we have developed a cryptographic LSI environment for testing side-channel attacks. The environment is designed such that small fluctuations in LSI power consumption can be measured. A printed circuit board, and control hardware and software are developed, and are available on our website to provide a uniform environment for side-channel testing of LSIs. Details of the developed environment are described in this paper, and its performance in measurements and tests is demonstrated through an experiment that replicates a side-channel attack.","PeriodicalId":299732,"journal":{"name":"The 1st IEEE Global Conference on Consumer Electronics 2012","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Development of evaluation environment for physical attacks against embedded devices\",\"authors\":\"T. Katashita, A. Sasaki, Y. Hori, M. Shiozaki, T. Fujino\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/GCCE.2012.6379924\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Physical attacks against cryptographic modules on embedded systems are different with theoretical analysis. Side-channel attacks, which are noninvasive physical attacks, exploit the measurable parameters of devices. In this study, we have developed a cryptographic LSI environment for testing side-channel attacks. The environment is designed such that small fluctuations in LSI power consumption can be measured. A printed circuit board, and control hardware and software are developed, and are available on our website to provide a uniform environment for side-channel testing of LSIs. Details of the developed environment are described in this paper, and its performance in measurements and tests is demonstrated through an experiment that replicates a side-channel attack.\",\"PeriodicalId\":299732,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The 1st IEEE Global Conference on Consumer Electronics 2012\",\"volume\":\"48 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-12-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The 1st IEEE Global Conference on Consumer Electronics 2012\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/GCCE.2012.6379924\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The 1st IEEE Global Conference on Consumer Electronics 2012","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/GCCE.2012.6379924","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Development of evaluation environment for physical attacks against embedded devices
Physical attacks against cryptographic modules on embedded systems are different with theoretical analysis. Side-channel attacks, which are noninvasive physical attacks, exploit the measurable parameters of devices. In this study, we have developed a cryptographic LSI environment for testing side-channel attacks. The environment is designed such that small fluctuations in LSI power consumption can be measured. A printed circuit board, and control hardware and software are developed, and are available on our website to provide a uniform environment for side-channel testing of LSIs. Details of the developed environment are described in this paper, and its performance in measurements and tests is demonstrated through an experiment that replicates a side-channel attack.