嵌入式设备物理攻击评估环境的开发

T. Katashita, A. Sasaki, Y. Hori, M. Shiozaki, T. Fujino
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引用次数: 1

摘要

针对嵌入式系统加密模块的物理攻击与理论分析不同。侧信道攻击是一种非侵入性的物理攻击,利用设备的可测量参数。在这项研究中,我们开发了一个用于测试侧信道攻击的加密LSI环境。这种环境被设计成可以测量LSI功耗的微小波动。开发了印刷电路板和控制硬件和软件,并在我们的网站上提供,为lsi的侧通道测试提供了统一的环境。本文描述了开发环境的细节,并通过一个复制侧信道攻击的实验证明了其在测量和测试中的性能。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Development of evaluation environment for physical attacks against embedded devices
Physical attacks against cryptographic modules on embedded systems are different with theoretical analysis. Side-channel attacks, which are noninvasive physical attacks, exploit the measurable parameters of devices. In this study, we have developed a cryptographic LSI environment for testing side-channel attacks. The environment is designed such that small fluctuations in LSI power consumption can be measured. A printed circuit board, and control hardware and software are developed, and are available on our website to provide a uniform environment for side-channel testing of LSIs. Details of the developed environment are described in this paper, and its performance in measurements and tests is demonstrated through an experiment that replicates a side-channel attack.
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