Maker’s Knowledge, between A Priori and A Posteriori

If Alice’s knowledge is the knowledge enjoyed by a maker how can this be qualified according to the three classic distinctions, which specify that truths can be necessary vs. contingent, analytic vs. synthetic, and a priori vs. a posteriori? This chapter argues that (a) we need to decouple a fourth distinction, namely informative vs. uninformative, from the previous three and, in particular, from its implicit association with analytic vs. synthetic and a priori vs. a posteriori; (b) such a decoupling facilitates, and is facilitated by, moving from a monoagent to a multiagent approach; (c) the decoupling and the multiagent approach enable a re-mapping of currently available positions in epistemology on these four dichotomies; (d) within such a re-mapping, two positions, capturing the nature of a witness’s knowledge and of a maker’s knowledge, can best be described as contingent, synthetic, a posteriori, and uninformative and as contingent, synthetic, weakly a priori (ab anteriori), and uninformative respectively.