首席执行官变动后的盈余管理:同时任命董事长和首席财务官的影响

Mark Wilson, Lian Wang
{"title":"首席执行官变动后的盈余管理:同时任命董事长和首席财务官的影响","authors":"Mark Wilson, Lian Wang","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-629X.2009.00324.x","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Using a sample of listed Australian firms from 1999 to 2007, we examine the relationship between discretionary accruals and concurrent senior management appointments. Employing panel data regression models and focusing on a measure of discretionary accruals that excludes the effect of transparent write-downs such as restructuring charges, we find that chief executive officer (CEO) appointments, as a general phenomenon, are not significantly associated with opaque earnings management in the year of appointment or the following year. However, we find that CEO changes accompanied by a concurrent change in board chairperson are associated with significant income-decreasing earnings management in the year of appointment. We detect no significant relationship between contemporaneous CEO and chief financial officer changes and discretionary accruals. We find no evidence of earnings management in the first compete financial period following CEO appointment, regardless of whether or not concurrent Chair or chief financial officer appointments occurred.","PeriodicalId":134477,"journal":{"name":"ARN Wiley-Blackwell Publishers Journals","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2009-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"34","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Earnings Management Following Chief Executive Officer Changes: The Effect of Contemporaneous Chairperson and Chief Financial Officer Appointments\",\"authors\":\"Mark Wilson, Lian Wang\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/j.1467-629X.2009.00324.x\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Using a sample of listed Australian firms from 1999 to 2007, we examine the relationship between discretionary accruals and concurrent senior management appointments. Employing panel data regression models and focusing on a measure of discretionary accruals that excludes the effect of transparent write-downs such as restructuring charges, we find that chief executive officer (CEO) appointments, as a general phenomenon, are not significantly associated with opaque earnings management in the year of appointment or the following year. However, we find that CEO changes accompanied by a concurrent change in board chairperson are associated with significant income-decreasing earnings management in the year of appointment. We detect no significant relationship between contemporaneous CEO and chief financial officer changes and discretionary accruals. We find no evidence of earnings management in the first compete financial period following CEO appointment, regardless of whether or not concurrent Chair or chief financial officer appointments occurred.\",\"PeriodicalId\":134477,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ARN Wiley-Blackwell Publishers Journals\",\"volume\":\"21 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2009-11-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"34\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ARN Wiley-Blackwell Publishers Journals\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-629X.2009.00324.x\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ARN Wiley-Blackwell Publishers Journals","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-629X.2009.00324.x","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 34

摘要

本文以1999年至2007年的澳大利亚上市公司为样本,研究了可自由支配应计利润与同时任命高级管理层之间的关系。采用面板数据回归模型,并将重点放在排除透明减记(如重组费用)影响的可自由支配应计利润的度量上,我们发现,作为一种普遍现象,首席执行官(CEO)任命与任命当年或次年的不透明盈余管理没有显著关联。然而,我们发现,在任命年度,CEO变更伴随着董事会主席的同时变更与显著的收入减少盈余管理相关。我们发现同期首席执行官和首席财务官变动与可自由支配应计利润之间没有显著关系。我们没有发现在CEO任命后的第一个竞争财务期间存在盈余管理的证据,无论是否同时任命了董事长或首席财务官。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Earnings Management Following Chief Executive Officer Changes: The Effect of Contemporaneous Chairperson and Chief Financial Officer Appointments
Using a sample of listed Australian firms from 1999 to 2007, we examine the relationship between discretionary accruals and concurrent senior management appointments. Employing panel data regression models and focusing on a measure of discretionary accruals that excludes the effect of transparent write-downs such as restructuring charges, we find that chief executive officer (CEO) appointments, as a general phenomenon, are not significantly associated with opaque earnings management in the year of appointment or the following year. However, we find that CEO changes accompanied by a concurrent change in board chairperson are associated with significant income-decreasing earnings management in the year of appointment. We detect no significant relationship between contemporaneous CEO and chief financial officer changes and discretionary accruals. We find no evidence of earnings management in the first compete financial period following CEO appointment, regardless of whether or not concurrent Chair or chief financial officer appointments occurred.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信