恶意软件爆发期间物联网设备连接决策的博弈论方法

Chin-Tser Huang, M. N. Sakib, L. Njilla, C. Kamhoua
{"title":"恶意软件爆发期间物联网设备连接决策的博弈论方法","authors":"Chin-Tser Huang, M. N. Sakib, L. Njilla, C. Kamhoua","doi":"10.1109/ICCNC.2019.8685493","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The paradigm of Internet of Things (IoT) aims to connect all the devices into a network. However, most IoT devices don’t have appropriate security protection, which allows cyber criminals to infect them through the network with malware and exploit them to launch attacks such as DDoS attacks or information stealing. Many proposed countermeasures, such as authentication enhancement and software update, are not practical d be to the constraints of IoT devices, malware’s fast spreading speed, and manufacturer laziness. One viable approach is to temporarily disconnect IoT devices to protect them from exploitation and to prevent infected ones from infecting more devices. However, in an IoT network, some devices may have significant responsibilities, for example serving as gateway to the Internet or in charge of critical monitoring or control tasks, and it may be beneficial to defer their disconnection. In this paper, we aim to apply game theory to formulate the problem of making decisions on the connectivity of IoT devices during malware outbreak as a repeated game, which allows individual IoT devices to make connectivity decision over time. We consider possible strategies that IoT devices can apply when calculating their payoff function, use numeric simulations to evaluate our game theoretic models, and derive several insights that can serve as guidelines for IoT network managers to configure the best connection/disconnection strategy for their IoT devices.","PeriodicalId":161815,"journal":{"name":"2019 International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC)","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Game Theoretic Approach for Making IoT Device Connectivity Decisions During Malware Outbreak\",\"authors\":\"Chin-Tser Huang, M. N. Sakib, L. Njilla, C. Kamhoua\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICCNC.2019.8685493\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The paradigm of Internet of Things (IoT) aims to connect all the devices into a network. However, most IoT devices don’t have appropriate security protection, which allows cyber criminals to infect them through the network with malware and exploit them to launch attacks such as DDoS attacks or information stealing. Many proposed countermeasures, such as authentication enhancement and software update, are not practical d be to the constraints of IoT devices, malware’s fast spreading speed, and manufacturer laziness. One viable approach is to temporarily disconnect IoT devices to protect them from exploitation and to prevent infected ones from infecting more devices. However, in an IoT network, some devices may have significant responsibilities, for example serving as gateway to the Internet or in charge of critical monitoring or control tasks, and it may be beneficial to defer their disconnection. In this paper, we aim to apply game theory to formulate the problem of making decisions on the connectivity of IoT devices during malware outbreak as a repeated game, which allows individual IoT devices to make connectivity decision over time. We consider possible strategies that IoT devices can apply when calculating their payoff function, use numeric simulations to evaluate our game theoretic models, and derive several insights that can serve as guidelines for IoT network managers to configure the best connection/disconnection strategy for their IoT devices.\",\"PeriodicalId\":161815,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2019 International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC)\",\"volume\":\"74 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-02-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2019 International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCNC.2019.8685493\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2019 International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCNC.2019.8685493","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2

摘要

物联网(IoT)的范式旨在将所有设备连接到网络中。然而,大多数物联网设备没有适当的安全保护,这使得网络犯罪分子可以通过网络感染恶意软件,并利用它们发动DDoS攻击或信息窃取等攻击。由于物联网设备的限制、恶意软件的快速传播速度和制造商的懒惰,许多建议的对策,如增强身份验证和软件更新,都是不切实际的。一种可行的方法是暂时断开物联网设备的连接,以保护它们免受利用,并防止受感染的设备感染更多设备。然而,在物联网网络中,一些设备可能有重要的责任,例如作为互联网的网关或负责关键的监控或控制任务,因此推迟断开连接可能是有益的。在本文中,我们的目标是应用博弈论将恶意软件爆发期间物联网设备的连接决策问题制定为一个重复的游戏,允许单个物联网设备随着时间的推移做出连接决策。我们考虑了物联网设备在计算其收益函数时可以应用的可能策略,使用数值模拟来评估我们的博弈论模型,并得出一些见解,这些见解可以作为物联网网络管理人员为其物联网设备配置最佳连接/断开策略的指导方针。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Game Theoretic Approach for Making IoT Device Connectivity Decisions During Malware Outbreak
The paradigm of Internet of Things (IoT) aims to connect all the devices into a network. However, most IoT devices don’t have appropriate security protection, which allows cyber criminals to infect them through the network with malware and exploit them to launch attacks such as DDoS attacks or information stealing. Many proposed countermeasures, such as authentication enhancement and software update, are not practical d be to the constraints of IoT devices, malware’s fast spreading speed, and manufacturer laziness. One viable approach is to temporarily disconnect IoT devices to protect them from exploitation and to prevent infected ones from infecting more devices. However, in an IoT network, some devices may have significant responsibilities, for example serving as gateway to the Internet or in charge of critical monitoring or control tasks, and it may be beneficial to defer their disconnection. In this paper, we aim to apply game theory to formulate the problem of making decisions on the connectivity of IoT devices during malware outbreak as a repeated game, which allows individual IoT devices to make connectivity decision over time. We consider possible strategies that IoT devices can apply when calculating their payoff function, use numeric simulations to evaluate our game theoretic models, and derive several insights that can serve as guidelines for IoT network managers to configure the best connection/disconnection strategy for their IoT devices.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信