有争议的愿景:公司法系统理论的价值

Tamara C. Belinfanti, Lynn A. Stout
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引用次数: 39

摘要

尽管公司在我们的经济、文化和政治中扮演着主导角色,但公司的性质和目的仍然备受争议。这种冲突在最近最高法院对“联合公民”和“爱好游说团”案的判决中凸显出来。尽管在过去的四分之一个世纪里,流行的说法是公司“属于”股东,应该追求“股东价值”,但对这种方法的支持正在减少,这种方法被认为是管理责任的必要条件。时至今日,这种观点仍主要以公司应寻求“长期”股东价值的观点存在。然而,正如本文所示,当股东价值被解释为“长期”股东价值时,它不再提供受欢迎的管理问责制。可以什么?本文认为,系统理论提供了一个答案。系统理论是一种发展良好的设计和性能测量方法,通常应用于工程、生物学、计算机科学和环境科学等领域。它提供了一种理解公司实体的性质和目的的方法,这种方法不仅与已经发展起来的许多其他方面相互冲突的公司愿景的元素相一致,而且与公司法和实践的重要和难以解释的特征相一致。它为衡量企业绩效提供了行之有效的方法,这些方法认识到多重目标的可能性和可持续性的重要性。它还警告说,由于忽视了系统理论的教训,股东价值思维可能鼓励了对公司治理的监管和政策干预,这些干预不仅无效,而且具有破坏性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Contested Visions: The Value of Systems Theory for Corporate Law
Despite the dominant role corporations play in our economy, culture, and politics, the nature and purpose of corporations remains hotly contested. This conflict was brought to the fore in the recent Supreme Court opinions in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby. Although the prevailing narrative for the past quarter-century has been that corporations “belong” to shareholders and should pursue “shareholder value,” support for this approach, which has been justified as essential for managerial accountability, is eroding. It persists today primarily in the form of the argument that corporations should seek “long-term” shareholder value. Yet, as this Article shows, when shareholder value is interpreted to mean “long-term” shareholder value, it no longer offers the sought-after managerial accountability. What can? This Article argues that systems theory offers an answer. Systems theory is a well-developed design and performance measuring methodology routinely applied in fields such as engineering, biology, computer science, and environmental science. It provides an approach to understanding the nature and purpose of corporate entities that is not only consistent with elements of the many otherwise-conflicting visions of the corporation that have been developed, but also with important and otherwise difficult-to-explain features of corporate law and practice. It offers proven methods for measuring corporate performance that recognize the possibility of multiple goals and the importance of sustainability. And it cautions that, by ignoring the lessons of systems theory, shareholder value thinking may have encouraged regulatory and policy interventions into corporate governance that are not only ineffective, but destructive.
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