{"title":"芬恩诉泰特美术馆董事会:英国人身隐私保护失去的机会","authors":"Aidan Economu","doi":"10.26686/vuwlr.v52i1.6840","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The inadequacies of English common and statutory law have left a noticeable gap in the UK's protection of physical privacy. Mann J's 2019 decision in Fearn v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery helped fill this gap as it acknowledged that overlooking between neighbours could constitute an actionable nuisance. A year later, the Court of Appeal reversed this development and reaffirmed that private nuisance cannot be used to combat breaches of privacy. This article evaluates the extent to which the High Court decision in Fearn was a useful and desirable tool for defending physical privacy in order to assess the correctness of the appellate decision. The article contends that Mann J's extension was a justified development as it conformed with precedent, the scheme and principles of private nuisance, the text and horizontal effect of art 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, cases decided in the European Court of Human Rights, and broader policy. However, the article acknowledges that Fearn was also a problematic development with limited potential as a protection mechanism. Its limitations arose from the conflict between traditional understandings of the right to privacy and nuisance's association with property, the land-based rationale for compensation in nuisance, the standing restrictions retained from Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd, irregularities with the common law's favourable attitude towards children's privacy, and Fearn's similarities to anti-harassment legislation. Overall, the article concludes that although Fearn was imperfect in its treatment of physical privacy, it was a step in the right direction and contributed at least partially to filling the persistent lacuna in English privacy law.","PeriodicalId":426444,"journal":{"name":"Victoria University of Wellington law review","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Fearn v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery: A Lost Opportunity for the UK's Protection of Physical Privacy\",\"authors\":\"Aidan Economu\",\"doi\":\"10.26686/vuwlr.v52i1.6840\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The inadequacies of English common and statutory law have left a noticeable gap in the UK's protection of physical privacy. Mann J's 2019 decision in Fearn v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery helped fill this gap as it acknowledged that overlooking between neighbours could constitute an actionable nuisance. A year later, the Court of Appeal reversed this development and reaffirmed that private nuisance cannot be used to combat breaches of privacy. This article evaluates the extent to which the High Court decision in Fearn was a useful and desirable tool for defending physical privacy in order to assess the correctness of the appellate decision. The article contends that Mann J's extension was a justified development as it conformed with precedent, the scheme and principles of private nuisance, the text and horizontal effect of art 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, cases decided in the European Court of Human Rights, and broader policy. However, the article acknowledges that Fearn was also a problematic development with limited potential as a protection mechanism. Its limitations arose from the conflict between traditional understandings of the right to privacy and nuisance's association with property, the land-based rationale for compensation in nuisance, the standing restrictions retained from Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd, irregularities with the common law's favourable attitude towards children's privacy, and Fearn's similarities to anti-harassment legislation. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
由于英国普通法和成文法的不足,英国在保护人身隐私方面留下了明显的空白。2019年,Mann J在Fearn诉泰特美术馆董事会一案中做出的决定帮助填补了这一空白,因为它承认邻居之间的俯瞰可能构成可起诉的滋扰。一年后,上诉法院推翻了这一发展,并重申私人滋扰不能用于打击侵犯隐私的行为。本文评估了高等法院在Fearn案中的判决在多大程度上是保护人身隐私的有用和理想的工具,以评估上诉判决的正确性。该条认为,Mann J的延长是一种合理的发展,因为它符合先例、私人妨害的办法和原则、《保护人权和基本自由公约》第8条的案文和横向影响、欧洲人权法院判决的案件以及更广泛的政策。然而,这篇文章承认,Fearn也是一个有问题的发展,作为一种保护机制的潜力有限。它的局限性源于对隐私权的传统理解与妨害与财产的关联之间的冲突,妨害赔偿的土地基础理论,Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd保留的长期限制,普通法对儿童隐私的有利态度的不规范,以及Fearn与反骚扰立法的相似之处。总体而言,本文的结论是,尽管Fearn在处理人身隐私方面并不完善,但这是朝着正确方向迈出的一步,至少在一定程度上填补了英国隐私法中持续存在的空白。
Fearn v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery: A Lost Opportunity for the UK's Protection of Physical Privacy
The inadequacies of English common and statutory law have left a noticeable gap in the UK's protection of physical privacy. Mann J's 2019 decision in Fearn v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery helped fill this gap as it acknowledged that overlooking between neighbours could constitute an actionable nuisance. A year later, the Court of Appeal reversed this development and reaffirmed that private nuisance cannot be used to combat breaches of privacy. This article evaluates the extent to which the High Court decision in Fearn was a useful and desirable tool for defending physical privacy in order to assess the correctness of the appellate decision. The article contends that Mann J's extension was a justified development as it conformed with precedent, the scheme and principles of private nuisance, the text and horizontal effect of art 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, cases decided in the European Court of Human Rights, and broader policy. However, the article acknowledges that Fearn was also a problematic development with limited potential as a protection mechanism. Its limitations arose from the conflict between traditional understandings of the right to privacy and nuisance's association with property, the land-based rationale for compensation in nuisance, the standing restrictions retained from Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd, irregularities with the common law's favourable attitude towards children's privacy, and Fearn's similarities to anti-harassment legislation. Overall, the article concludes that although Fearn was imperfect in its treatment of physical privacy, it was a step in the right direction and contributed at least partially to filling the persistent lacuna in English privacy law.