Feminist Philosophy of Mind

A feminist approach to philosophy of mind asks whether mind is gendered, raced, classed, and so on, and whether differences of gender, race, class, and other social categories are a matter of mind. This chapter outlines the scope, content, and aims of this emerging field with reference to three decisive moments in its evolution. First, the correspondence between Princess Elisabeth and Descartes is examined, with particular emphasis on Descartes’s claim that those who do not have the habit of philosophizing will be more apt to perceive the union of mind and body than their separation. Second, the chapter investigates Simone de Beauvoir’s contention that woman’s consciousness in a sexist society is a doubled or divided consciousness. Third, the chapter turns to Naomi Scheman’s criticism of the view that beliefs, desires, and emotions are individuated, identifiable states. Taken together, these arguments challenge the assumptions that minds are ahistorical, universal, and nonrelational and suggest instead that minds are is affected in substantive ways by oppression.