消除跨境银行业务的监管障碍

Nikos Maragopoulos
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The proposed changes have become more significant today amidst the COVID-19 crisis and its impact on the European banking sector and the European economy. The European Central Bank (ECB) and the Single Resolution Board (SRB) have granted (temporary) relief measures to banks to withstand the effects of the pandemic and continue lending to the economy. Nonetheless, in light of the ECB’s pressure on banks to address effectively and timely the financial impact from the COVID-19 crisis, it is necessary to establish a framework to relieve banking groups from the unnecessary capital and liquidity burden placed on them. The aim of the proposed framework is to improve the banks’ ability to generate sustainable profits and, hence, to enhance their capacity to absorb the impact from the COVID-19 crisis and any future external shock as well. \n \nThe proposed regulatory reform is governed by three (3) principles. 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引用次数: 2

摘要

银行业联盟的建立和欧洲单一规则手册的引入,旨在为单一银行市场铺平道路,并打破银行与主权国家之间的联系。理想情况下,银行应该遵守一套共同的规则,在银行业联盟内开展业务,而不必遵守不同的监管实践和方法。然而,立法框架中仍然存在漏洞和差异,这些漏洞和差异导致监管分散,其中包括允许国家当局采取限制性措施,以保护国家利益不受共同利益的损害。本文分析了目前在银行业联盟中运营的跨境银行集团内部资金自由流动的障碍,即子公司在个人层面满足审慎要求(资本、流动性和内部MREL)的义务以及对集团内部风险敞口的限制。为此,本文提出了对欧盟监管框架的一些修正,旨在实现双重目标;加强银行的盈利能力和整体财务状况,并促进银行业的财务整合和巩固,最好是通过跨境合并和收购。在新冠肺炎危机及其对欧洲银行业和欧洲经济产生影响的今天,拟议的修改变得更加重要。欧洲中央银行(ECB)和单一决议委员会(SRB)已向银行批准(临时)救济措施,以抵御大流行的影响,并继续向经济提供贷款。尽管如此,鉴于欧洲央行要求银行有效、及时地应对新冠肺炎危机的财务影响,有必要建立一个框架,以减轻银行集团所承受的不必要的资本和流动性负担。拟议框架的目的是提高银行产生可持续利润的能力,从而提高它们吸收新冠肺炎危机影响和未来任何外部冲击的能力。拟议的监管改革遵循三(3)条原则。首先,引入默认方法,减少对子公司的审慎要求(资本、流动性和内部MREL),同时取消对集团内部风险敞口的限制。其次,特别强调了监管审查和评估过程(SREP)和欧洲央行和SRB分别进行的可解决性评估,其结果可能导致审慎要求的增加。第三,建立一个可信的升级机制,以确保母公司在子公司财务状况恶化时仍将致力于为其提供资本和/或流动性支持。拟议的机制可作为一个安全网,防止子公司破产,并在发生这种情况时尽量减少对东道国国内金融稳定和财政主权的负面影响。根据拟议的升级机制,希望利用拟议的资本和流动性缓解措施的银行集团应在强制性基础上签署集团内部金融支持协议。此外,集团复苏计划应包括所有享有拟议优惠待遇的子公司,不论其对银行集团和(或)东道国的重要性如何。一旦触发了与子公司相关的恢复触发器,就应该采取恢复行动来恢复子公司的财务状况。如果母公司不愿意对子公司财务状况的恶化做出适当的反应,欧洲央行和国家储备银行应该采取早期干预措施,这些措施可以扩展到母公司。作为最后的手段,如果一个重要的子公司进入“失败或可能失败”的情况,SRB可以决定减记和/或将符合mrel资格的内部工具转换为股权,独立或与决议行动相结合。拟议的监管措施可以以各种方式促进金融一体化和金融稳定,特别是如果同时完成一些机构改革(例如建立欧洲存款保险计划)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Removing the Regulatory Barriers to Cross-Border Banking
The establishment of the Banking Union and the introduction of the European Single Rulebook seek to pave the way for a single banking market and to break the nexus between banks and sovereigns. Ideally, banks should be subject to a common set of rules and do business across the Banking Union without having to comply with different supervisory practices and methodologies. However, there are still loopholes and discrepancies in the legislative framework that cause regulatory fragmentation, among others, by allowing national authorities to take restrictive measures to protect national interests against the common interest. The present paper analyzes the current obstacles to the free flow of funds within cross-border banking groups operating in the Banking Union, namely the obligation for subsidiaries to meet prudential requirements (capital, liquidity and internal MREL) at individual level and the restrictions to intragroup exposures. To that end, this paper proposes some amendments to the Union regulatory framework aiming to achieve a dual objective; to strengthen banks’ profitability and overall financial position and to promote financial integration and consolidation of the banking sector, preferably through cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The proposed changes have become more significant today amidst the COVID-19 crisis and its impact on the European banking sector and the European economy. The European Central Bank (ECB) and the Single Resolution Board (SRB) have granted (temporary) relief measures to banks to withstand the effects of the pandemic and continue lending to the economy. Nonetheless, in light of the ECB’s pressure on banks to address effectively and timely the financial impact from the COVID-19 crisis, it is necessary to establish a framework to relieve banking groups from the unnecessary capital and liquidity burden placed on them. The aim of the proposed framework is to improve the banks’ ability to generate sustainable profits and, hence, to enhance their capacity to absorb the impact from the COVID-19 crisis and any future external shock as well. The proposed regulatory reform is governed by three (3) principles. Firstly, the introduction of a default approach for the application of reduced prudential requirements (capital, liquidity and internal MREL) to subsidiaries accompanied by the lifting of restrictions to intragroup exposures. Secondly, particular emphasis is placed on the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) and the resolvability assessment carried out by the ECB and the SRB respectively whose outcome may result in an increase of the prudential requirements. Thirdly, the establishment of a credible escalation mechanism to ensure that parent entities will remain committed to providing capital and/or liquidity support to subsidiaries should their financial situation deteriorate. The proposed mechanism serves as a safety net to prevent the failure of subsidiaries and, if that happens, to minimize the negative implications for domestic financial stability and fiscal sovereignty of host Member States. Under the proposed escalation mechanism, banking groups wishing to take advantage of the proposed capital and liquidity relief measures should sign intragroup financial support agreements on a mandatory basis. Furthermore, the group recovery plan should cover all the subsidiaries enjoying the proposed preferential treatment, irrespective of their materiality for the banking group and/or the host Member State. Once a recovery trigger relevant to a subsidiary is triggered, recovery action should be taken to restore the subsidiary’s financial position. If the parent entity is reluctant to respond appropriately to the worsening of the financial situation of the subsidiary, the ECB and the SRB should take early intervention measures, which could be extended to the parent entity. As a last resort measure, if a material subsidiary comes into a “failing or likely to fail” situation, the SRB may decide the write-down and/or conversion of internal MREL-eligible instruments into equity either independently or in combination with resolution action. The proposed regulatory measures could promote both financial integration and financial stability in various ways, particularly if were accompanied by the completion of some institutional reforms (e.g. establishment of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme).
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