{"title":"知识产权制度下竞争供应链渠道结构与政府补贴策略研究","authors":"M. Shu, Jianhua Ma","doi":"10.1145/3564858.3564891","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Based on Individual Producer Responsibility (IPR) and government recycling subsidy policies, this paper studies a two-tier duopoly competing supply chains model consisting of two manufacturers and two exclusive retailers. Both manufacturers produce substitutable products and bear the product recycling cost with (dis-) economies of scale. Based on the IPR system, we first study the impact of product competition, the scale effect of recycling, and the government recycling subsidy policy on the vertical channel structure selection strategies and selection equilibrium of the competing supply chains. Subsequently, we reveal how to design government subsidy policy with symmetrical supply chain structure combinations in order to achieve maximal social welfare.","PeriodicalId":331960,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Management and Management Science","volume":"150 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Research on Channel Structure and Government Subsidy Strategy of Competing Supply Chains under IPR System\",\"authors\":\"M. Shu, Jianhua Ma\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3564858.3564891\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Based on Individual Producer Responsibility (IPR) and government recycling subsidy policies, this paper studies a two-tier duopoly competing supply chains model consisting of two manufacturers and two exclusive retailers. Both manufacturers produce substitutable products and bear the product recycling cost with (dis-) economies of scale. Based on the IPR system, we first study the impact of product competition, the scale effect of recycling, and the government recycling subsidy policy on the vertical channel structure selection strategies and selection equilibrium of the competing supply chains. Subsequently, we reveal how to design government subsidy policy with symmetrical supply chain structure combinations in order to achieve maximal social welfare.\",\"PeriodicalId\":331960,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Management and Management Science\",\"volume\":\"150 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-08-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Management and Management Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3564858.3564891\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Management and Management Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3564858.3564891","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Research on Channel Structure and Government Subsidy Strategy of Competing Supply Chains under IPR System
Based on Individual Producer Responsibility (IPR) and government recycling subsidy policies, this paper studies a two-tier duopoly competing supply chains model consisting of two manufacturers and two exclusive retailers. Both manufacturers produce substitutable products and bear the product recycling cost with (dis-) economies of scale. Based on the IPR system, we first study the impact of product competition, the scale effect of recycling, and the government recycling subsidy policy on the vertical channel structure selection strategies and selection equilibrium of the competing supply chains. Subsequently, we reveal how to design government subsidy policy with symmetrical supply chain structure combinations in order to achieve maximal social welfare.