{"title":"强制协议设计分析,以防止DoS攻击","authors":"S. Lakkavalli, H. Khosravi","doi":"10.1109/ICCCN.2004.1401737","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This work discusses a design analysis for the protection of the ForCES protocol against denial of service (DoS) attacks, which is a key requirement for the ForCES protocol. In order to meet this requirement, the control and data messages in the protocol needs to be separated. The separation scheme consists of: (1) separating the congestion aware, control and data transport connections such as TCP connections and (2) gives higher priority for control. The design issues along with the experimental results are discussed.","PeriodicalId":229045,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 13th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (IEEE Cat. No.04EX969)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2004-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"ForCES protocol design analysis for protection against DoS attacks\",\"authors\":\"S. Lakkavalli, H. Khosravi\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICCCN.2004.1401737\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This work discusses a design analysis for the protection of the ForCES protocol against denial of service (DoS) attacks, which is a key requirement for the ForCES protocol. In order to meet this requirement, the control and data messages in the protocol needs to be separated. The separation scheme consists of: (1) separating the congestion aware, control and data transport connections such as TCP connections and (2) gives higher priority for control. The design issues along with the experimental results are discussed.\",\"PeriodicalId\":229045,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings. 13th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (IEEE Cat. No.04EX969)\",\"volume\":\"25 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2004-10-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings. 13th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (IEEE Cat. No.04EX969)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCCN.2004.1401737\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings. 13th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (IEEE Cat. No.04EX969)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCCN.2004.1401737","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
ForCES protocol design analysis for protection against DoS attacks
This work discusses a design analysis for the protection of the ForCES protocol against denial of service (DoS) attacks, which is a key requirement for the ForCES protocol. In order to meet this requirement, the control and data messages in the protocol needs to be separated. The separation scheme consists of: (1) separating the congestion aware, control and data transport connections such as TCP connections and (2) gives higher priority for control. The design issues along with the experimental results are discussed.