{"title":"自由、选择和同意。关于自由意志家长主义困境的注解","authors":"A. Marciano","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2433007","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this note is to discuss libertarian paternalism from the perspective of the concept of “freedom of choice”. For libertarian paternalists, freedom remains defined as it is defined by neo-classical economists and “consent” to the conditions of choice is never envisaged as an issue. Actually, it may even be said that “consent” does not fit into the framework adopted by libertarian paternalists. Thus, libertarian paternalists face a dilemma: if they draw all the consequences of their behavioral assumptions – and have to take “consent” into account – but then taking consent into account is not compatible with their behavioral framework.","PeriodicalId":106117,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Political Theory: Political Philosophy (Topic)","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Freedom, Choice and Consent. A Note on a Libertarian Paternalist Dilemma\",\"authors\":\"A. Marciano\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2433007\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The purpose of this note is to discuss libertarian paternalism from the perspective of the concept of “freedom of choice”. For libertarian paternalists, freedom remains defined as it is defined by neo-classical economists and “consent” to the conditions of choice is never envisaged as an issue. Actually, it may even be said that “consent” does not fit into the framework adopted by libertarian paternalists. Thus, libertarian paternalists face a dilemma: if they draw all the consequences of their behavioral assumptions – and have to take “consent” into account – but then taking consent into account is not compatible with their behavioral framework.\",\"PeriodicalId\":106117,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PSN: Other Political Theory: Political Philosophy (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"102 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-04-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PSN: Other Political Theory: Political Philosophy (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2433007\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PSN: Other Political Theory: Political Philosophy (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2433007","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Freedom, Choice and Consent. A Note on a Libertarian Paternalist Dilemma
The purpose of this note is to discuss libertarian paternalism from the perspective of the concept of “freedom of choice”. For libertarian paternalists, freedom remains defined as it is defined by neo-classical economists and “consent” to the conditions of choice is never envisaged as an issue. Actually, it may even be said that “consent” does not fit into the framework adopted by libertarian paternalists. Thus, libertarian paternalists face a dilemma: if they draw all the consequences of their behavioral assumptions – and have to take “consent” into account – but then taking consent into account is not compatible with their behavioral framework.
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