《大人物和肥猫:关于高薪的辩论》

Alex Edmans, Luke Hildyard, Sophie Jarvis, D. Knight, Rebecca Lowe, Harry McCreddie, P. Ormerod, V. Pryce, J. Shackleton, J. Stephenson, Alex Wild
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引用次数: 1

摘要

与不久前的过去形成对比的是,现在人们普遍担心企业中某些薪酬结构的明显过度。在过去的二十年里,最高工资的增长速度远远快于平均工资水平。这在一定程度上是全球化和通信技术发展的结果,但也可能是市场被操纵和“裙带资本主义”的结果。有人断言,股东在制定高管薪酬方面没有足够的影响力,高管薪酬是由薪酬委员会和顾问决定的,他们在提高高管薪酬方面有既得利益。重要的是要了解薪酬数据是如何产生和使用的,看看财富的变化(作为股价变化的结果),而不是简单地看当前的薪酬方案。人们常常声称,首席执行官的薪酬与公司业绩无关。要评估这一说法,需要比活动人士和媒体经常使用的更为复杂的分析。通过这样的分析,薪酬似乎确实会对业绩变化产生(积极和消极的)反应,尽管可能低于应有的水平。长期激励计划(LTIPs)的广泛采用受到了广泛批评;人们认为,这些计划往往设计得很糟糕,导致了高管薪酬不必要的上涨。各国政府在应对民粹主义的行动呼吁时需要谨慎。目前要求大型企业详细说明其薪酬结构的基本情况可能是可以接受的,对公共部门的薪酬保持密切关注是明智的。但是,永久赋予国家权力来确定薪酬比率甚至薪酬上限,会带来一些危险,而那些要求政府干预的人没有充分讨论这些危险。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Top Dogs and Fat Cats: The Debate on High Pay
In contrast to the recent past, there is now widespread concern about the apparent excesses of some pay structures in corporate businesses. Top pay has risen much faster than average levels of pay in the last twenty years. This is in part the consequence of globalisation and developments in communications technology, but it may also be a result of rigged markets and "crony capitalism". It is asserted that shareholders do not have enough influence on setting executive pay, which is determined by remuneration committees and consultants with a vested interest in boosting top pay. It is important to understand how pay data are produced and used an look at changes in wealth (as a result of changes in share prices), rather than simply at the current pay package. A claim is often made that CEO pay bears no relationship to company performance. To assess this claim requires rather more sophisticated analysis than is often employed by activists and the media. Using such analysis, it does seem that pay reacts (both positively and negatively) to changes in performance, though possibly less than it should. The widespread adoption of Long-Term Incentive Plans (LTIPs) has been widely criticised; it is felt that these schemes are often badly designed and have led to unnecessary inflation of executive pay. Governments need to be careful in how they react to populist calls for action. The current requirement for large businesses to spell out the basis of their pay structure may be acceptable, and maintaining a watchful eye on pay in the public sector is sensible. But giving the state power permanently to fix pay ratios or even pay caps brings dangers which are not sufficiently discussed by those demanding government intervention.
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