A. Rapoport, W. Stein, Vincent Mak, R. Zwick, Darryl A. Seale
{"title":"具有恒定或可变容量的批队列中的内生到达","authors":"A. Rapoport, W. Stein, Vincent Mak, R. Zwick, Darryl A. Seale","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807460","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study batch queueing systems with continuous time, finite commuter populations, single server, and endogenously determined arrival times. Symmetric equilibrium solutions in mixed strategies are constructed and subsequently tested in two experiments that examine two different batch queueing systems, one with a fixed server capacity, and the other with a variable server capacity. With experience in playing the stage queueing game repeatedly, experimental results from groups of twenty subjects support equilibrium play on the aggregate level when the server capacity is fixed and commonly known. When it is known to be variable, randomly changing from round to round, subjects diverge from equilibrium play and increase their individual payoffs substantially by significantly shortening their waiting time.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"21","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Endogenous arrivals in batch queues with constant or variable capacity\",\"authors\":\"A. Rapoport, W. Stein, Vincent Mak, R. Zwick, Darryl A. Seale\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/1807406.1807460\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study batch queueing systems with continuous time, finite commuter populations, single server, and endogenously determined arrival times. Symmetric equilibrium solutions in mixed strategies are constructed and subsequently tested in two experiments that examine two different batch queueing systems, one with a fixed server capacity, and the other with a variable server capacity. With experience in playing the stage queueing game repeatedly, experimental results from groups of twenty subjects support equilibrium play on the aggregate level when the server capacity is fixed and commonly known. When it is known to be variable, randomly changing from round to round, subjects diverge from equilibrium play and increase their individual payoffs substantially by significantly shortening their waiting time.\",\"PeriodicalId\":142982,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory\",\"volume\":\"40 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-05-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"21\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807460\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807460","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Endogenous arrivals in batch queues with constant or variable capacity
We study batch queueing systems with continuous time, finite commuter populations, single server, and endogenously determined arrival times. Symmetric equilibrium solutions in mixed strategies are constructed and subsequently tested in two experiments that examine two different batch queueing systems, one with a fixed server capacity, and the other with a variable server capacity. With experience in playing the stage queueing game repeatedly, experimental results from groups of twenty subjects support equilibrium play on the aggregate level when the server capacity is fixed and commonly known. When it is known to be variable, randomly changing from round to round, subjects diverge from equilibrium play and increase their individual payoffs substantially by significantly shortening their waiting time.