道德难民市场

M. Gerver
{"title":"道德难民市场","authors":"M. Gerver","doi":"10.21248/GJN.11.1.140","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"States are increasingly paying other states to host refugees. For example, in 2010 the EU paid Libya €50 million to continue hosting the refugees within its borders, and five years later Australia offered Cambodia $31.16 million to accept asylum seekers living in Naru. These exchanges, which I call ‘refugees markets,’ have faced criticism by philosophers. Some philosophers claim the markets fail to ensure true protection, and are demeaning, expressing just how much refugees are unwanted. In response, some have defended refugee markets, claiming they can ensure refugees have protection and are not demeaned. I argue that many markets do demean refugees, and therefore have moral costs, but can still be all-things-considered preferable to alternative schemes if they protect refugees more than these alternative schemes.","PeriodicalId":117351,"journal":{"name":"Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Moral Refugee Markets\",\"authors\":\"M. Gerver\",\"doi\":\"10.21248/GJN.11.1.140\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"States are increasingly paying other states to host refugees. For example, in 2010 the EU paid Libya €50 million to continue hosting the refugees within its borders, and five years later Australia offered Cambodia $31.16 million to accept asylum seekers living in Naru. These exchanges, which I call ‘refugees markets,’ have faced criticism by philosophers. Some philosophers claim the markets fail to ensure true protection, and are demeaning, expressing just how much refugees are unwanted. In response, some have defended refugee markets, claiming they can ensure refugees have protection and are not demeaned. I argue that many markets do demean refugees, and therefore have moral costs, but can still be all-things-considered preferable to alternative schemes if they protect refugees more than these alternative schemes.\",\"PeriodicalId\":117351,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric\",\"volume\":\"24 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-11-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.21248/GJN.11.1.140\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.21248/GJN.11.1.140","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3

摘要

各国越来越多地向其他国家支付收容难民的费用。例如,2010年,欧盟向利比亚支付了5000万欧元,以继续在其境内收容难民;五年后,澳大利亚向柬埔寨提供了3116万美元,以接收居住在纳鲁的寻求庇护者。这些我称之为“难民市场”的交易受到了哲学家们的批评。一些哲学家声称,市场无法确保真正的保护,而且在贬低人,表明有多少难民是不受欢迎的。作为回应,一些人为难民市场辩护,声称他们可以确保难民得到保护,不被贬低。我认为,许多市场确实贬低了难民,因此有道德成本,但如果它们比其他方案更多地保护难民,那么它们仍然可以被认为比其他方案更可取。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Moral Refugee Markets
States are increasingly paying other states to host refugees. For example, in 2010 the EU paid Libya €50 million to continue hosting the refugees within its borders, and five years later Australia offered Cambodia $31.16 million to accept asylum seekers living in Naru. These exchanges, which I call ‘refugees markets,’ have faced criticism by philosophers. Some philosophers claim the markets fail to ensure true protection, and are demeaning, expressing just how much refugees are unwanted. In response, some have defended refugee markets, claiming they can ensure refugees have protection and are not demeaned. I argue that many markets do demean refugees, and therefore have moral costs, but can still be all-things-considered preferable to alternative schemes if they protect refugees more than these alternative schemes.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信