{"title":"交易成本:规模经济、最优经济、均衡经济和效率经济——一个基于博弈论的交易成本模型","authors":"L'aszl'o K'allay, T. Tak'acs, L. Trautmann","doi":"10.20944/preprints202010.0535.v1","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this article is to propose a core game theory model of transaction costs wherein it is indicated how direct costs determine the probability of loss and subsequent transaction costs. The existence of optimum is proven, and the way in which exposure influences the location of the optimum is demonstrated. The decisions are described as a two-player game and it is discussed how the transaction cost sharing rule determines whether the optimum point of transaction costs is the same as the equilibrium of the game. A game modelling dispute between actors regarding changing the share of transaction costs to be paid by each party is also presented. Requirements of efficient transaction cost sharing rules are defined, and it is posited that a solution exists which is not unique. Policy conclusions are also devised based on principles of design of institutions to influence the nature of transaction costs.","PeriodicalId":143159,"journal":{"name":"arXiv: Theoretical Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Transaction Costs: Economies of Scale, Optimum, Equilibrium and Efficiency – A Game Theory-Based Model of Transaction Costs\",\"authors\":\"L'aszl'o K'allay, T. Tak'acs, L. Trautmann\",\"doi\":\"10.20944/preprints202010.0535.v1\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The aim of this article is to propose a core game theory model of transaction costs wherein it is indicated how direct costs determine the probability of loss and subsequent transaction costs. The existence of optimum is proven, and the way in which exposure influences the location of the optimum is demonstrated. The decisions are described as a two-player game and it is discussed how the transaction cost sharing rule determines whether the optimum point of transaction costs is the same as the equilibrium of the game. A game modelling dispute between actors regarding changing the share of transaction costs to be paid by each party is also presented. Requirements of efficient transaction cost sharing rules are defined, and it is posited that a solution exists which is not unique. Policy conclusions are also devised based on principles of design of institutions to influence the nature of transaction costs.\",\"PeriodicalId\":143159,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv: Theoretical Economics\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-08-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv: Theoretical Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202010.0535.v1\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv: Theoretical Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202010.0535.v1","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Transaction Costs: Economies of Scale, Optimum, Equilibrium and Efficiency – A Game Theory-Based Model of Transaction Costs
The aim of this article is to propose a core game theory model of transaction costs wherein it is indicated how direct costs determine the probability of loss and subsequent transaction costs. The existence of optimum is proven, and the way in which exposure influences the location of the optimum is demonstrated. The decisions are described as a two-player game and it is discussed how the transaction cost sharing rule determines whether the optimum point of transaction costs is the same as the equilibrium of the game. A game modelling dispute between actors regarding changing the share of transaction costs to be paid by each party is also presented. Requirements of efficient transaction cost sharing rules are defined, and it is posited that a solution exists which is not unique. Policy conclusions are also devised based on principles of design of institutions to influence the nature of transaction costs.