{"title":"市场与等级:混合治理形式的激励制度理论","authors":"Richard Makadok, R. Coff","doi":"10.5465/AMR.2009.36982628","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We create a taxonomy of hybrid governance forms and develop a formal theory that predicts when a given hybrid form will be efficient. Our model is unique in that we consider cross-task synergies in a multitask principal-agent model, where hybrid forms result as principals try to motivate cooperation among agents indirectly through incentives, ownership, and formal authority. We conclude with a discussion of other mechanisms that might also help us understand and predict hybrid governance forms.","PeriodicalId":236420,"journal":{"name":"POL: Human Resource Management Models (Topic)","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2009-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"184","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Both Market and Hierarchy: An Incentive-System Theory of Hybrid Governance Forms\",\"authors\":\"Richard Makadok, R. Coff\",\"doi\":\"10.5465/AMR.2009.36982628\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We create a taxonomy of hybrid governance forms and develop a formal theory that predicts when a given hybrid form will be efficient. Our model is unique in that we consider cross-task synergies in a multitask principal-agent model, where hybrid forms result as principals try to motivate cooperation among agents indirectly through incentives, ownership, and formal authority. We conclude with a discussion of other mechanisms that might also help us understand and predict hybrid governance forms.\",\"PeriodicalId\":236420,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"POL: Human Resource Management Models (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"87 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2009-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"184\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"POL: Human Resource Management Models (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.2009.36982628\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"POL: Human Resource Management Models (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.2009.36982628","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Both Market and Hierarchy: An Incentive-System Theory of Hybrid Governance Forms
We create a taxonomy of hybrid governance forms and develop a formal theory that predicts when a given hybrid form will be efficient. Our model is unique in that we consider cross-task synergies in a multitask principal-agent model, where hybrid forms result as principals try to motivate cooperation among agents indirectly through incentives, ownership, and formal authority. We conclude with a discussion of other mechanisms that might also help us understand and predict hybrid governance forms.