近场气隙隐蔽通道攻击

Mordechai Guri
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引用次数: 1

摘要

气隙系统由于其处理的敏感信息而与互联网隔离。本文提出了一种新的隐蔽信道攻击,可以将敏感信息从高度隔离的气隙系统泄漏到附近的移动电话。在气隙计算机上运行的恶意软件可以通过在目标系统上执行精心编写的代码来产生无线电波。恶意代码利用现代计算机的动态功耗,并操纵CPU内核的瞬时负载。利用这种技术,恶意软件可以控制计算机的内部利用,并产生0-60 kHz频段的低频电磁辐射。敏感信息(例如,文件、加密密钥、生物特征数据和键盘记录)可以通过发射的信号进行调制,并由附近的移动电话以1000比特/秒的最大速度接收。我们展示了由恶意内部人员或访客携带的带有简单天线的标准智能手机可以用作隐蔽接收器。最后,我们提出了一套针对这种气隙攻击的对策。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Near Field Air-Gap Covert Channel Attack
Air-gapped systems are isolated from the Internet due to the sensitive information they handle.This paper presents a new covert channel attack that enables the leaking of sensitive information from highly isolated, air-gapped systems to nearby mobile phones. Malware running on an air-gapped computer can generate radio waves by executing crafted code on the target system. The malicious code exploits the dynamic power consumption of modern computers and manipulates the momentary loads on CPU cores. With this technique, malware can control the computer's internal utilization and generate low-frequency electromagnetic radiation in the 0-60 kHz band. Sensitive information (e.g., files, encryption keys, biometric data, and keylogging) can be modulated over the emanated signals and received by a nearby mobile phone at a max speed of 1000 bit/sec. We show that a standard smartphone with a simple antenna carried by a malicious insider or visitor can be used as a covert receiver. Finally, we present a set of countermeasures to this air-gap attack.
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