网格代理审计基础设施的设计和实现

Christopher Kunz, Christian Szongott, J. Wiebelitz, C. Grimm
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引用次数: 2

摘要

单点登录和授权是现代网格基础设施的关键需求。这些要求通常由X.509、私有密钥基础设施(PKI)和代理证书来实现。但是,代理证书很容易被恶意的第三方获取和滥用。目前还没有办法让最终用户发现这种滥用。我们设计了一个解决方案,可以对基于globus的网格中的网格代理使用情况进行彻底审计,并实现了一个通过web服务接口接受审计信息并将其保存到后端数据库的服务。我们对Grid Security Infrastructure进行了修改,如果用户希望跟踪凭证的使用情况,允许从Globus组件内部发送审计跟踪。基于web的前端显示所有记录的信息。有了我们的方法,专业用户现在可以密切监控他们的凭证在提交作业后是如何被使用的。这将有助于在网格基础设施和委托身份验证和授权中建立信任。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Design and implementation of a Grid proxy auditing infrastructure
Single sign-on and delegation of rights are key requirements for modern Grid infrastructures. These requirements are usually facilitated by X.509 und Private-Key Infrastructures (PKI) and proxy certificates. Proxy certificates, however, can be obtained and abused by a malicious third party. There is currently no method for end users to detect such abuse. We have designed a solution that enables a thorough auditing of Grid proxy usage in Globus-based Grids and implemented a service that accepts auditing information via a web service interface and saves them to a back-end database. We introduce modifications to the Grid Security Infrastructure that allow sending audit trails from within Globus components if the user desires to track credential usage. A web-based front-end shows all logged information. With our approach, expert users can now closely monitor how their credentials are used after job submission. This will help build trust in Grid infrastructures and delegated authentication and authorization.
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