A Critical Examination of Douglas' Argument to Justify the Involvement of Non-Epistemic Values in Science

many discussions. One way to justify the role of these values is the argument from inductive risk. The aim of this article is to examine a version of this argument that is presented by Douglas. By raising the question about “evidential sufficiency”, Douglas advances her argument to justify the influence of non-epistemic values. Assuming the correctness of Douglas’ argument, we try to determine the answer of “evidential sufficiency” based on the conclusion of her argument. Even considering both epistemic and non-epistemic values, we will show that the question of sufficiency will not have a proper answer. Because to determine evidential sufficiency, we will either confront circularity or force to add other ambiguous things. Also, we will explain that Douglas should have sought the “evidential sufficiency” by emphasizing more on the practice of scientists in actuality, in which there is no requirement to incorporate scientific claims with policy-making claims. This criticism is sympathetic to some other criticisms of Douglas, according to which she incorporated pragmatic and epistemic domains of science.