{"title":"在生产经济中,有限承诺何时起作用?","authors":"Kyoung Jin Choi, Jungho Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2375531","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the conditions under which the first-best allocation without commitment is sustainable in a production economy. We find that allowing capital accumulation can help to sustain the first-best allocation, although it is known to create a distortion. For some production technologies, gains from efficient resource allocation between agents can be so large that it can compensate for the increase in the outside option that arises when capital moves to the more productive agent from the less productive agent.","PeriodicalId":375570,"journal":{"name":"Diversification Strategy & Policy eJournal","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"When Does Limited Commitment Matter in a Production Economy?\",\"authors\":\"Kyoung Jin Choi, Jungho Lee\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2375531\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We investigate the conditions under which the first-best allocation without commitment is sustainable in a production economy. We find that allowing capital accumulation can help to sustain the first-best allocation, although it is known to create a distortion. For some production technologies, gains from efficient resource allocation between agents can be so large that it can compensate for the increase in the outside option that arises when capital moves to the more productive agent from the less productive agent.\",\"PeriodicalId\":375570,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Diversification Strategy & Policy eJournal\",\"volume\":\"88 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-01-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Diversification Strategy & Policy eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2375531\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Diversification Strategy & Policy eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2375531","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
When Does Limited Commitment Matter in a Production Economy?
We investigate the conditions under which the first-best allocation without commitment is sustainable in a production economy. We find that allowing capital accumulation can help to sustain the first-best allocation, although it is known to create a distortion. For some production technologies, gains from efficient resource allocation between agents can be so large that it can compensate for the increase in the outside option that arises when capital moves to the more productive agent from the less productive agent.