{"title":"被动退出","authors":"Joshua Mitts","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3716249","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Share lending allows passive investors to generate revenue from a decline in portfolio value. When an active mutual fund exits a portfolio firm, passive index funds belonging to the same fund family raise the cost of borrowing the firm’s shares for short selling. To identify supply-side shifts, I exploit changes in the identity of active managers exogenous to within-portfolio variation in the informational sensitivity of share lending costs. The exercise of market power is pronounced in value lending programs targeting hard-to-borrow securities. Share lenders with market power capture most of the surplus arising from the price decline.","PeriodicalId":431402,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Securities Law: U.S. (Topic)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Passive Exit\",\"authors\":\"Joshua Mitts\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3716249\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Share lending allows passive investors to generate revenue from a decline in portfolio value. When an active mutual fund exits a portfolio firm, passive index funds belonging to the same fund family raise the cost of borrowing the firm’s shares for short selling. To identify supply-side shifts, I exploit changes in the identity of active managers exogenous to within-portfolio variation in the informational sensitivity of share lending costs. The exercise of market power is pronounced in value lending programs targeting hard-to-borrow securities. Share lenders with market power capture most of the surplus arising from the price decline.\",\"PeriodicalId\":431402,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"LSN: Securities Law: U.S. (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"44 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-12-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"LSN: Securities Law: U.S. (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3716249\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"LSN: Securities Law: U.S. (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3716249","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Share lending allows passive investors to generate revenue from a decline in portfolio value. When an active mutual fund exits a portfolio firm, passive index funds belonging to the same fund family raise the cost of borrowing the firm’s shares for short selling. To identify supply-side shifts, I exploit changes in the identity of active managers exogenous to within-portfolio variation in the informational sensitivity of share lending costs. The exercise of market power is pronounced in value lending programs targeting hard-to-borrow securities. Share lenders with market power capture most of the surplus arising from the price decline.