智能电网智能电表异常溯源的安全数据聚合方案

Shiying Yao, Jian Zeng, Shuang Wang, Xiaolong Yang, Jingtang Luo, Ziqi Wang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

为了防止智能电表数据在传输过程中被攻击者窃取,通常的做法是安全地汇总数据并向电力公司报告。现有的聚合方案虽然能够保护用户的用电隐私,但无法区分受到虚假数据注入(false data injection, FDI)攻击的数据,难以追踪和排除异常数据源。针对这一问题,本研究提出了一种能够跟踪异常节点的智能电表数据聚合方案。汇聚中心(AC)将智能电表分成多组,同一组中的智能电表通过计算相邻两个时间段的功耗的海灵格距离是否超过设定的阈值来相互检测异常行为,然后反馈给AC。AC通过多次“分组检测”迭代,定位出包含异常短信的组。然后AC排除异常节点,采用EC-EIGamal同态加密计算出组内正常短信的功耗总和。实验结果表明,在多次FDI攻击下,检测准确率为73.3% ~ 100%,可以有效地跟踪和排除被攻击的短信。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Secure Data Aggregation Scheme Enabling Abnormal Smart Meters Traceback for Smart Grid
In order to prevent smart meter data from being stolen by attackers during transmission, it is common practice to securely aggregate the data and report it to the power company. Although the existing aggregation scheme can protect users' electricity consumption privacy, it cannot distinguish the data that has been attacked by false data injection (FDI), meaning it is difficult to trace and exclude abnormal data sources. To solve this problem, the study proposes a smart meter data aggregation scheme that can trace abnormal nodes. The aggregation center (AC) divides the smart meter (SM) into multiple groups, and the SM in the same group detect the abnormal behavior with each other by calculating whether the Hellinger distance of the power consumption of two adjacent timespan of their counterparts exceeds the set threshold, then feedback to the AC. Through multiple “grouping-detection” iterations, AC locates the groups which contains abnormal SMs. Then AC excludes the abnormal nodes and calculates the normal SMs’ power consumption aggregate value in the group by employing EC-EIGamal homomorphic encryption. Experimental results show that the detection accuracy is 73.3%∼100% under multiple FDI attacks, and attacked SMs can be effectively traced and excluded.
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