政府作为积极股东

B. Eckbo
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引用次数: 2

摘要

美国政府收购了AIG、通用汽车等公司的大量股份,通过捍卫“大而不能倒”的原则,实质上成为了“最后的所有者”。我在国会作证时主张,政府应该在行使投票权方面采取积极主动的立场,以促进最佳治理实践。我并不主张政府直接干预其作为大股东的公司的商业运作。我真正推荐的是目前由养老基金等大型机构股东普遍行使的股东维权主义形式,这是确保公司在最有效的治理体系下运作所必需的。小股东受益于大股东的存在,因为只有大股东才有经济动机以有效的方式行使投票权。因此,政府现在处于一个独特的位置,可以改善效率低下的治理体系和做法。但是,为了达到这种积极效果,政府必须根据价值最大化原则,对股份表决采取积极的态度。我讨论了美国机构投资界(作为相对较大的股东)建议积极投票以改善治理的四个领域:(1)董事选举改革,(2)消除代价高昂的收购防御,(3)拆分首席执行官和董事会主席职位,以及(4)高管薪酬(“薪酬话语权”)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Government as Active Shareholder
The U.S. government has acquired large shareholdings in companies like AIG, GM and others, essentially becoming "owner of last resort" through its defense of the "too big to fail" doctrine. I argue in this Congressional testimony that the government should adopt a pro-active stance in terms of exercising its voting rights to promote best governance practices. I am not advocating direct government intervention in the business operations of the firms in which it is a large shareholder. What I do recommend is the form of shareholder activism commonly exercised today by large institutional shareholders such as pension funds, and which is needed to ensure that the companies operate under the most effcient governance system. Minority shareholders benefit from the presence of a large blockholder because only the latter has the economic incentive to exercise voting rights in an efficient manner. Thus, the government is now in a unique position to improve ineffcient governance systems and practices. However, to have this positive effect, the government must take a pro-active stance on share-voting in accordance with the value-maximizing principle. I discuss four areas where the institutional investment community (as relatively large shareholders) in the U.S. recommends active voting to improve governance: (1) director election reform, (2) elimination of costly takeover defenses, (3) splitting CEO and board chairmanship positions, and (4) executive compensation ("say on pay").
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