积极分子与被俘获的监管者

CSR & Management Practice eJournal Pub Date : 2013-10-31 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2348064

J. Daubanes, J. Rochet

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引用次数: 3

摘要

我们分析了在监管机构被行业俘获的监管行业中激进主义的后果。与普通的经济主体不同，积极分子对金钱激励不敏感。此外，他们不像监管机构那样了解情况，而且他们的行动产生了沉重的成本。然而，我们发现，激进主义可能会增加社会福利，因为它约束了被俘获的监管者，降低了监管体系不完善的社会成本。

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Activists versus Captured Regulators

We analyze the consequences of activism in a regulated industry where the regulator has been captured by the industry. Unlike ordinary economic agents, activists are insensitive to monetary incentives. Moreover, they are less well informed than regulators and their actions generate dead-weight costs. Yet we find that activism may increase social welfare because it disciplines captured regulators and reduces the social cost of imperfect regulatory systems.

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CSR & Management Practice eJournal

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