我们应该信任基金经理吗?加拿大共同基金治理细看

Zhongzhi He, M. Kusý, Deepak Singh, Samir Trabelsi
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引用次数: 1

摘要

加拿大共同基金的独特之处在于两种治理机制——公司治理机制和信托治理机制并存。本研究实证检验了各机制对基金收费和绩效的影响。我们发现,与信托基金相比,公司级基金收取更高的费用,但提供了更高的费用调整后回报。然后,我们分析了各种董事会特征对公司类基金收费和业绩的影响。我们发现,董事会规模较小、CEO双轨制和独立董事比例较高的董事会更有可能收取较低的费用。此外,较小的董事会与较高的费用调整后的业绩密切相关。我们的研究支持代理理论而不是管理理论,并为加拿大投资者和监管机构提供了有价值的指导。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Should We Trust Fund Managers? A Close Look at the Canadian Mutual Fund Governance
Abstract The Canadian mutual fund setting is unique in that two governance mechanisms – corporate and trust – coexist. This study empirically examines the impact of each mechanism on fund fees and performance. We find that corporate class funds charge higher fees but deliver superior fee-adjusted returns than trust funds. We then analyze the impact of various board characteristics on fees and performance for corporate class funds. We find that a board with smaller size, CEO duality, and a higher percentage of independent directors is more likely to charge lower fees. In addition, smaller boards are strongly associated with higher fee-adjusted performance. Our study supports agency theory over stewardship theory and provides valuable guidelines for Canadian investors and regulatory agencies.
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