The United States and Taiwan’s Nuclear Weapons Program, 1967–1978

Chapter 6 examines the nonproliferation dispute between the United States and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan between 1967 and 1987. Like the South Korean case, the Nixon administration’s efforts to extricate the United States from the Vietnam War, draw down US troop levels in East and Southeast Asia, and seek a rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China precipitated this dispute. The overriding goal of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations was to enlist China as an ally of convenience against the Soviet Union, but without completely abandoning Taiwan. The Ford and the Carter administrations used a mix of threats to suspend bilateral nuclear cooperation and promises of limited arms transfers to convince ROC premier (and later president) Chiang Ching-kuo to abandon nuclear weapons research in the late 1970s. Reports that Taiwan achieved a “controlled” nuclear reaction in 1987 led the Reagan administration to demand ROC president Lee Teng-hui renounce all nuclear weapons research.