{"title":"计算技术和问责制:美国证券交易委员会的交互式数据项目","authors":"A. Lowe, J. Locke, A. Lymer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1714495","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States mandated a new digital reporting system for US companies in late 2008. The new generation of information provision has been dubbed by Chairman Cox, ‘interactive data’ (SEC, 2006). Despite the promise of its name, we find that in the development of the project retail investors are invoked as calculative actors rather than engaged in dialogue. Similarly, the potential for the underlying technology to be applied in ways to encourage new forms of accountability appears to be forfeited in the interests of enrolling company filers.We theorise the activities of the SEC and in particular its chairman at the time, Christopher Cox, over a three year period, both prior to and following the ‘credit crisis’. We argue that individuals and institutions play a central role in advancing the socio-technical project that is constituted by interactive data. We adopt insights from ANT (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987, 2005b) and governmentality (Miller, 2008; Miller and Rose, 2008) to show how regulators and the proponents of the technology have acted as spokespersons for the interactive data technology and the retail investor. We examine the way in which calculative accountability has been privileged in the SEC’s construction of the retail investor as concerned with atomised, quantitative data (Kamuf, 2007; Roberts, 2009; Tsoukas, 1997). We find that the possibilities for the democratising effects of digital information on the internet has not been realised in the interactive data project and that it contains risks for the very investors the SEC claims to seek to protect.","PeriodicalId":431402,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Securities Law: U.S. (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Calculative Technologies and Accountability: The SEC’s Interactive Data Project\",\"authors\":\"A. Lowe, J. Locke, A. Lymer\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1714495\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States mandated a new digital reporting system for US companies in late 2008. The new generation of information provision has been dubbed by Chairman Cox, ‘interactive data’ (SEC, 2006). Despite the promise of its name, we find that in the development of the project retail investors are invoked as calculative actors rather than engaged in dialogue. Similarly, the potential for the underlying technology to be applied in ways to encourage new forms of accountability appears to be forfeited in the interests of enrolling company filers.We theorise the activities of the SEC and in particular its chairman at the time, Christopher Cox, over a three year period, both prior to and following the ‘credit crisis’. We argue that individuals and institutions play a central role in advancing the socio-technical project that is constituted by interactive data. We adopt insights from ANT (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987, 2005b) and governmentality (Miller, 2008; Miller and Rose, 2008) to show how regulators and the proponents of the technology have acted as spokespersons for the interactive data technology and the retail investor. We examine the way in which calculative accountability has been privileged in the SEC’s construction of the retail investor as concerned with atomised, quantitative data (Kamuf, 2007; Roberts, 2009; Tsoukas, 1997). We find that the possibilities for the democratising effects of digital information on the internet has not been realised in the interactive data project and that it contains risks for the very investors the SEC claims to seek to protect.\",\"PeriodicalId\":431402,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"LSN: Securities Law: U.S. (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"25 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-11-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"LSN: Securities Law: U.S. (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1714495\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"LSN: Securities Law: U.S. (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1714495","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
2008年底,美国证券交易委员会(SEC)要求美国公司采用新的数字报告系统。新一代的信息提供被Cox主席称为“交互式数据”(SEC, 2006)。尽管它的名字很有希望,但我们发现,在项目的发展中,散户投资者被称为算计的参与者,而不是参与对话。同样,在鼓励新形式的问责制方面应用基础技术的潜力,似乎也会因为公司注册的利益而丧失。我们将美国证券交易委员会的活动,特别是当时的主席克里斯托弗·考克斯(Christopher Cox)在“信贷危机”之前和之后的三年时间里的活动理论化。我们认为,个人和机构在推进由交互式数据构成的社会技术项目中发挥着核心作用。我们采用ANT的见解(Callon, 1986;拉图尔,1987,2005b)和治理(米勒,2008;Miller and Rose, 2008),以展示监管机构和技术支持者如何充当交互式数据技术和散户投资者的代言人。我们研究了计算问责制在SEC对散户投资者的构建中享有特权的方式,因为它涉及原子化的定量数据(Kamuf, 2007;罗伯茨,2009;Tsoukas, 1997)。我们发现,互联网上数字信息的民主化效应的可能性尚未在交互式数据项目中实现,而且它对美国证券交易委员会声称寻求保护的投资者也存在风险。
Calculative Technologies and Accountability: The SEC’s Interactive Data Project
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States mandated a new digital reporting system for US companies in late 2008. The new generation of information provision has been dubbed by Chairman Cox, ‘interactive data’ (SEC, 2006). Despite the promise of its name, we find that in the development of the project retail investors are invoked as calculative actors rather than engaged in dialogue. Similarly, the potential for the underlying technology to be applied in ways to encourage new forms of accountability appears to be forfeited in the interests of enrolling company filers.We theorise the activities of the SEC and in particular its chairman at the time, Christopher Cox, over a three year period, both prior to and following the ‘credit crisis’. We argue that individuals and institutions play a central role in advancing the socio-technical project that is constituted by interactive data. We adopt insights from ANT (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987, 2005b) and governmentality (Miller, 2008; Miller and Rose, 2008) to show how regulators and the proponents of the technology have acted as spokespersons for the interactive data technology and the retail investor. We examine the way in which calculative accountability has been privileged in the SEC’s construction of the retail investor as concerned with atomised, quantitative data (Kamuf, 2007; Roberts, 2009; Tsoukas, 1997). We find that the possibilities for the democratising effects of digital information on the internet has not been realised in the interactive data project and that it contains risks for the very investors the SEC claims to seek to protect.